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Clearinghouse Overconfidence 
Mark J. Roe* 
Regulatory reaction to the 2008–2009 financial crisis focused 
on complex financial instruments that deepened the crisis. A 
consensus emerged that these risky financial instruments should 
move through safe, strong clearinghouses, which would be bulwarks 
against systemic risk, and that the destructive impact of the failures 
during the crisis of AIG, Lehman Brothers, and the Reserve Primary 
Fund could have been softened or eliminated had strong clearing-
houses been in place. Via the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, 
Congress instructed regulators to construct clearinghouses through 
which these risky financial instruments would trade and settle. 
Clearinghouses could cut financial risk, reduce contagion, and halt a 
local financial problem before it becomes an economy-wide crisis. 
But clearinghouses are weaker bulwarks against financial 
contagion, financial panic, and systemic risk than is commonly 
thought. They may well be unable to defend the economy against 
financial stress such as that of the 2008–2009 crisis. Although they 
are efficient financial platforms in ordinary times, they do little to 
reduce systemic risk in crisis times. They generally do not reduce the 
core risk targeted—that the failure of a financial firm will cause 
other firms to fail—but rather transfer that risk of loss to others. The 
major reduction in risk among the inside-the-clearinghouse traders is 
largely achieved by pushing that risk elsewhere, often to a 
systemically dangerous spot. Financial contagion can thus side-step 
the clearinghouse fortress and bring down other core financial 
institutions. Worse, clearinghouses could not have readily handled 
the major stresses that afflicted the economy in 2008–2009, could 
well have transmitted and magnified them, and can only weakly affect 
the type of financial stress that Congress targeted with Dodd-Frank. 
When we add in the other weaknesses of the new clearinghouses—as 
too-big-to-fail institutions, as institutions whose members’ incentives 
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to contain clearinghouse riskiness are weaker than the public’s, and 
as institutions that will not be easy to regulate—even the direction of 
clearinghouses’ impact on systemic risk is uncertain. 
The stakes are high in correctly assessing the value of clearing-
houses in containing systemic risk. Much like an overconfidence 
inspired by powerful military fortresses that an invading enemy can 
side-step, the reigning overconfidence in clearinghouses lulls 
regulators to be satisfied that they have done much to arrest 
problems of contagion and systemic risk by building up clearing-
houses, when they have not. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S MAGINOT LINE 
Clearinghouses’ potential power to reduce systemic risk came to the fore 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Their attraction is easy to see: 
Financial institutions regularly trade risky investments. If one major trading 
institution fails to make good on its obligations to another, the first’s failure 
could be contagious, spreading outward through the interconnected financial 
system, inducing interconnected financial institutions to collapse one after 
another, like a row of dominoes, unless regulators can prop up one of the early 
dominoes before contagion knocks down the entire row. One strategically-
placed financial institution’s failure puts the entire financial system at risk of 
malfunctioning, rendering it unable to channel funds through the economy. As 
a result, economic activity weakens. 
But, regulatory thinking now runs, if those risky trades moved through 
clearinghouses, then the clearinghouse firewall would stop contagion short. A 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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major trading institution could fail, but the clearinghouse would stop the failure 
from pulling down others. The clearinghouse would vigilantly require its 
members to post collateral, which the clearinghouse would apply against a 
failing member’s obligations. And the clearinghouse could call on its solvent 
members to contribute capital to allow the clearinghouse to make good on the 
failed firm’s debts. 
Had these risky trades cleared in 2008, the financial crisis would not have 
been as deep, proponents asserted. Consequently, Congress’s major statutory 
reaction to the crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act, requires that the risky trades be 
cleared.
1 It’s one of the few postcrisis regulatory efforts that is well along the 
road toward implementation. Dodd-Frank will move “trillions of dollars in 
derivatives transactions . . . into a clearing environment.”
2 Clearinghouses will, 
it’s thought, be fortress-like bulwarks against systemic risk. 
Clearinghouses do improve trading efficiencies, reduce informational 
disparities among traders, and  compress complex trading rings into simpler 
obligations. They can speed up settlements, and can yield more accurate market 
information to regulators. But the raison d’être for the current infatuation—
containing contagion from spreading from a failing but systemically important 
firm
3—is oversold, and often false. The analysis here will show that 
clearinghouses can only marginally lower systemic risk. 
Two reasons explain why clearinghouses’ potential to contain systemic 
risk is weaker than the Dodd-Frank enactors hoped. First, a clearinghouse 
cannot usually contain the central systemic risk of financial contagion from an 
undercollateralized counterparty’s  failure, because it cannot eliminate the 
targeted loss from the economy. It generally can only transfer the loss 
elsewhere. It can, as advertised, reduce the risk to the clearinghouse members if 
one critical financial institution fails to make good on a cleared product, but it 
does so mainly by placing that loss in other institutions. Some of this is known 
to some analysts but appears not to have been fully appreciated by 
policymakers; this fundamental misunderstanding about risk transfer, in turn, 
weakens several of the other accepted benefits of clearinghouses. 
Here I organize, deepen, and extend the general risk transfer principle to 
show how, for each visible benefit extolled for clearinghouses, the risk transfer 
 
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 723, 725(c), 763, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–81, 1762–68, (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code). Clearing basics: When a trade clears, the two parties make their own deal, then give 
their trade over to the clearinghouse. The clearinghouse picks up the obligations to and from each side. 
Each party becomes obligated to the clearinghouse and no longer to the party with which it traded. 
2. RENA  S.  MILLER,  CONG.  RESEARCH  SERV., R41715, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN 
DERIVATIVES CLEARING 4 (2011), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1832&context=key_workplace.  
3. For close general analysis of systemic risk, see George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, 
What Is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?, 7 INDEP. REV. 371 
(2003). 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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principle reduces and often eliminates their  systemic benefit. Moreover, I 
extend prior thinking to show that (1) as long as the markets and institutions 
where the risks land are systemically important, the systemic benefit  of 
clearinghouses will be reduced and often fully offset by this systemic cost, and 
(2) the risk and loss transferred out can quite easily end up in a systemically 
dangerous spot.  
Indeed, the policy rationale behind clearinghouses is that some institutions 
are far too systemically connected to be allowed to fail. The clearinghouse will, 
however, dampen the consequences of such a failure, making it acceptable. But 
removing one channel for the risk and loss to spread can readily just push the 
risk and loss into another connected channel, endangering other vital 
institutions. It is as if Congress and the regulators were building forts to halt 
systemic risk, when the construction’s impact would largely induce the 
enemy—systemic risk—to detour and attack along another path, sliding around 
the fortress to enter the financial heartland on an equally destructive path. 
Clearinghouses’ multiple weaknesses in controlling systemic risk—from the 
possibility of the clearinghouses just moving the risk elsewhere, to the 
possibility that risk mutualization inside clearinghouses  endangers some 
institutions when it saves others, to the possibility the clearinghouses will 
themselves be systemically dangerous and too big to fail—are not separate and 
distinct problems but can all be organized around this risk transfer problem, 
which I do here in this Article. 
Second, the clearinghouse is defenseless against other potent channels of 
systemic risk beyond the failure of a vital stand-alone financial institution. 
Congress and the regulators needed to match up clearinghouses’ potential uses 
against the core  problems in the financial crisis, but did not do so. The 
clearinghouse is primarily targeted to contain the failure of a single firm from 
spreading through the interconnected financial system. But the financial crisis 
was not induced by the failure of a single firm. Multiple major institutions 
failed simultaneously, and others tottered dangerously. The crisis attacked the 
economy when financial markets rapidly revalued mortgage securities owned 
throughout the financial system, not when a single firm, or small number of 
firms, failed. Many interconnected firms started selling their assets to raise 
cash. As many sold, prices deteriorated and more newly weakened institutions 
found their asset values deteriorating, inducing them to sell as well. And then 
the interconnected financial firms could no longer understand whether other 
firms with which they were dealing were or were not solvent. So they ceased 
dealing with one another. Panic ensued. Clearinghouses cannot contain this 
kind of downward asset price spiral and panic. Worse, they can exacerbate such 
a situation. As such, the clearinghouse initiative is not targeted to contain 
enough of the core financial problems of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. 
These then are the major contributions made in this Article: to deepen and 
extend the risk transfer principle. First, I show how the principle applies across 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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the board to clearinghouses’ capacity to contain systemic risk and not just to 
one or two of its potential strengths. Then, I demonstrate how clearinghouses, 
even at their best, cannot contain the types of risk that afflicted the financial 
system and the American economy during the 2008–2009 financial and 
economic crisis. The fit between the actual 2008–2009 crisis and the risks that 
clearinghouses target is a  poor one. As such, the clearinghouse regulatory 
efforts are misguided. We have not designed a system that is strongly reactive 
to the real problems of the last financial crisis. 
*  *  * 
The roadmap for this Article follows: In Part I, I recount the elements of 
the recent financial crisis that many believe clearinghouses are capable of 
curing, and I outline the major regulatory activity in building good 
clearinghouses. In Part II, I outline the efficiency advantages of clearinghouses 
in building a market in the cleared product by enhancing price transparency, by 
compressing dealer spreads (which makes trading cheaper), by centralizing 
collateral holding, by mutualizing risk, and by simplifying trade mechanics by 
netting. I also identify the major systematic advantage Congress and the 
regulators have claimed for clearinghouses: arresting financial contagion 
emanating from the failure of a major, interconnected financial firm,
4  by 
building better means to collect collateral that backs up that firm’s trades and 
by mutualizing among the traders the losses from that firm’s failure. 
In Part III, I show, however, that while clearinghouses can provide 
substantial basic trading efficiencies, they cannot provide the intended broad 
systemic advantage. Enhanced collateralization protects the clearinghouse, but 
exposes other financial players to greater loss. The misperceptions in current 
regulatory and analytic discourse are clarified when one analyzes the 
clearinghouse using the best bankruptcy scholarship on setoff. The 
clearinghouse, like bankruptcy setoff, primarily transfers losses, without 
decreasing the system’s total riskiness, turning the key question into whether 
those who are made to bear the systemic risk can handle it better than those 
who transfer it. The answer is not evident. Part III then shows that this risk 
transfer principle is analogous to well-known analytics of corporate debt. Debt 
does not, as proponents once thought, reduce corporate risk directly. Its first 
effect is to transfer that risk. These insights are captured in the famous 
Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Propositions from finance. 
In Part IV, I extend the risk transfer principle—that clearinghouses 
transfer risk and that the transfer can move risk from strong institutions to weak 
ones as readily as the converse—to show how the risk transfer problem 
 
4. E.g., Phil Mattingly & Silla Brush, JPMorgan’s Losses Become Tool in Dodd-Frank Rules 
Debate, BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2013), www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-05-22/cftc-to-release-
clearing-proposal-for-index-swaps-gensler-says.html (“‘Standard swaps between financial firms will 
move into central clearing, which will significantly lower the risks of the highly interconnected 
financial system,’ Gensler said.”). 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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reduces, and in some instances reverses, the other purported benefits of 
clearinghouses. For example, the second most widely extolled benefit of 
clearinghouses is their supposed capacity to insure, mutualize, and thereby 
dissipate the risk of a single firm’s failure. But the risk transfer principle 
applies here as well, in that the clearinghouse could as easily gather, funnel, 
and expand systemic risk by pulling previously decentralized, discrete, and 
systemically containable risks into a single platform. Moreover, 
mutualization—a form of diversification—can sometimes handle the 
idiosyncratic risk from a single firm’s failure; but diversification is not a viable 
strategy for arresting market-wide, systemic risk. 
I then advance the concept that the clearinghouse cannot deal effectively 
with the actual systemic risks that afflicted the financial system in 2008. 
Clearinghouse proponents extol its capacity to thwart the contagion coming 
from the failure of a single, large, vital financial institution, aiming to stop that 
failure from taking down the rest of the financial system. But the core systemic 
risk problem of the 2008–2009 financial crisis came not from a single major 
institution’s failure, but from multiple major American financial institutions all 
suffering similar large reverses simultaneously, due to an economy-wide 
overinvestment in what turned out to be low-value mortgage securities. A 
simultaneous, common failure across major financial institutions is not a risk 
that a clearinghouse can, or is even designed to, handle. 
More was happening in the financial crisis than a single major firm’s 
failure, which a well-functioning clearinghouse might have contained. Even the 
list of actual failures is large—AIG, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, the 
Reserve Primary Fund, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual—and an extended 
list would need to include the major near failures of Bank of America, 
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and the deterioration of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. Systemic risk was pervasive, not isolated in a single firm. It appeared via 
the sudden system-wide realization that many financial institutions were 
overinvested in overvalued mortgage assets. Further, from 2007 to 2009, there 
was a downward asset price spiral as firms liquidated collateral at fire sale 
prices, driving more firms to be worthless (because they held assets of the type 
that other firms were selling at fire sale prices), which in turn drove those firms 
to sell more collateral to raise cash. Even clearinghouse proponents do not offer 
the clearinghouse as a bulwark to thwart this kind of downward asset price 
spiral. They do not make that claim for  good reason—because the 
clearinghouse cannot thwart that spiral, and, as I show below, can readily 
exacerbate it. 
In Part V, I deepen existing doubts as to clearinghouses, again by using 
the risk transfer uncertainty principle, and also show that potential rebuttals to 
the limits to clearinghouses do not reverse the Article’s core argument. The 
benefits remaining after we account for the risks transferred are much reduced. 
Moreover, while clearinghouses are reputed to be unsinkable, they are not. 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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Hence, clearinghouse construction may move regulators from having to bail out 
a systemically dangerous failed financial institution to having to bail out a 
systemically dangerous clearinghouse. This scenario is not far-fetched: during 
the 1987 stock market crash, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange came within 
minutes of failing, which would have deeply damaged the New York Stock 
Exchange’s capacity to operate, with catastrophic consequences.
5  
Lastly, I conclude that although clearinghouses’ key posited value is to 
contain counterparty failure, their capacity to manage counterparty failure does 
not actually contain systemic risk. They do not eliminate the loss emanating 
from counterparty failure, but instead primarily redirect it to other financial 
institutions, which  can readily fail. These other institutions will often be 
systemically vital. Moreover, clearinghouse construction does not respond well 
to the systemic problems that afflicted American finance in the 2008–2009 
crisis, with regulators now mainly aiming to deal with a problem that was not 
in play. 
Regulators may succeed in building powerful, indestructible clearing-
houses. But just as the twentieth century’s powerful, indestructible Maginot 
Line of fortresses in northern France only displaced the path of an enemy 
invasion, without deterring it or stopping it, the twenty-first century’s 
clearinghouse fortresses will largely fail to stymie systemic risk in the next 
crisis.
6 
I. 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE MISSING CLEARINGHOUSE 
The financial crisis began when failures in the mortgage market hit 
financial giants, disabling Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, attacking 
 
5. See Ben S. Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 133, 
143–45 (1990). On the text’s “within minutes”: three minutes. See infra Part V.B., note 130 and 
accompanying text. 
6. The metaphoric applicability of the Maginot Line error to the clearinghouse thesis I advance 
in this Article comes from its having been a costly fortification that an invading army side-stepped 
instead of hitting directly, and because its costliness short-changed better defensive measures.  
  The Maginot Line was “a line of defensive fortifications built before World War II to protect the 
eastern border of France but easily  outflanked by German invaders[.]”  Maginot Line Definition, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,  http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/maginot%20line. Its 
impressive engineering, and ultimate failure, made it a metaphor for “a defensive barrier or strategy 
that inspires a false sense of security.” Id. While it would likely have been effective if attacked directly, 
it proved to be a strategic failure because it only moved the location of the attack without changing the 
fact and effectiveness of the invasion. See also WILLIAM ALLCORN, THE MAGINOT LINE 1928–45, 4 
(2003);  MARC  ROMANYCH  &  MARTIN  RUPP,  MAGINOT  LINE  1940:  BATTLES ON THE FRENCH 
FRONTIER 5 (2010). Analogously, the systemic risk that the clearinghouse is targeted to contain will 
largely be diverted, will appear elsewhere, and will not be eliminated. But if policymakers are now 
satisfied that they have done the right thing, they will be less likely to attend to more efficacious 
strategies and will lack the resources to do so.  
The Maginot Line metaphor for other parts of Dodd-Frank has occurred to others. E.g., Steven A. 
Ramirez, The Dodd-Frank Act as Maginot Line, 15 CHAPMAN L. REV. 109 (2011).  03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, inducing a large bank, Washington Mutual, to 
fail, and threatening the viability of other major financial institutions like Bank 
of America, Citibank, and Merrill Lynch. The entire financial system was at 
risk and, for a time, basic financial activity slowed. 
A. The Crisis, in Brief 
1. Financial Failure at AIG, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, and Lehman Brothers  
AIG, the massive insurer that failed in 2008, wrote credit default swaps in 
which it promised for a fee to buy up loans that its customers had extended to 
firms, governments, and—indirectly via investment in mortgage pools—
homeowners.
7 If a defined credit event occurred—such as if the borrower failed 
to pay a lender that had bought a credit default swap from AIG—AIG obliged 
itself to buy the weakened claim at a previously  agreed price. AIG’s 
counterparties thereby obtained both assurance for their investment and 
regulatory benefits, in that banks could treat their loans as if they were as safe 
as AIG itself was perceived to be, and not risky like their underlying 
borrowers.
8 
AIG’s counterparties did not typically require collateral from AIG, 
because they originally saw AIG as a strong, AAA-rated financial institution, 
beyond financial reproach, with a balance sheet seemingly stronger than that of 
its counterparties.
9 By December 31, 2007, AIG was responsible for more than 
$500 billion worth of these obligations, including $60 billion in the mortgage-
backed securities industry.
10 
But AIG lost massive sums elsewhere, largely in its own mortgage-related 
investments.
11 When those losses weakened AIG, counterparties to its credit 
default swaps finally demanded collateral from AIG, but by then AIG was too 
weak to post enough good collateral to support its deals.
12  In the end, the 
 
  7.  The official account is in OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL  INSPECTOR  GENERAL FOR THE 
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIGTARP 10-003, FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT 
PAYMENTS TO AIG  COUNTERPARTIES  3 (2009), available at  http://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20 
Reports/Factors_Affecting_Efforts_to_Limit_Payments_to_AIG_Counterparties.pdf [hereinafter 
“SIGTARP AIG”]; see also  Adam Davidson, How AIG Fell Apart,  REUTERS  (Sept. 18, 2008), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/18/us-how-aig-fell-apart-idUSMAR85972720080918. 
  8.  SIGTARP AIG, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
  9.  Id. at 8. A typical arrangement among less strong financial parties is that each initially 
posts some collateral for its obligation and then they adjust their collateral levels as the underlying 
contract becomes more or less valuable to one party or the other. 
10. See AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 
15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (FORM 10-K), at 122 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.ezodproxy.com/AIG/2008/AR2007/images/AIG_10K2007.pdf. 
11. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: GOVERNMENTAL RESCUES 
OF “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 25 (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://fcic-static 
.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0831-Governmental-Rescues.pdf. 
12. SIGTARP AIG, supra  note  7; Rajna Gibson & Carsten Murawski, Margining in 
Derivatives Markets and the Stability of the Banking Sector, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 1119 (2013); 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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United States picked up the bill and paid off AIG’s obligations for fear that, if 
AIG’s obligations were not paid, further financial havoc would ensue. 
The authorities’ decision to bail out AIG was eased by the market reaction 
to the prior collapse of Lehman Brothers, the huge investment bank. “Lehman 
was a major participant in both the cleared futures markets . . .  and in the 
bilateral [over-the-counter, off-the-clearinghouse] derivatives markets, where it 
[directly] faced dealer and customer counterparties.”
13  As rumors spread of 
Lehman’s cash shortfall, its trading partners closed out their positions with 
Lehman or demanded that it post more collateral.
14 When Lehman, lacking 
both cash and good collateral, could not comply, its trading partners were left 
exposed to not being paid. One by one, it looked like the financial dominoes 
might topple. The Reserve Fund, a large money market fund, failed, in part 
because it held obligations from Lehman, which Lehman could not pay.
15 This 
led to the government guaranteeing all money market deposits for a time, to 
prevent a run of money market investors from the funds.
16 
The government stabilized other unsteady financial  institutions that 
lenders and borrowers had become reluctant to deal with. Citigroup, which 
includes the huge Citibank, was at risk, leading the government to infuse $45 
billion in new capital and to guarantee $300 billion of Citi’s risky assets.
17 
Bank of America similarly received a capital infusion from the government of 
$45 billion and guarantees of $118 billion of its illiquid assets.
18 Both big banks 
 
Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1185, 
1188 n.99 (2010). 
13. Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case Study in 
Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 655 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
14. Anton R. Valukas, 4 Report of the Examiner 1101, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 
No. 08-3555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), available at http://jenner.com/lehman/VOLUME%204.pdf. 
15. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 11, at 25. Money market funds take cash from 
their customers and promise to be ready to pay the cash back. They invest the cash from their 
customers in short-term obligations from other entities. The Reserve Fund invested enough in Lehman 
Brothers such that when Lehman failed, it failed as well.  
16. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee 
Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx. 
17. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
SIGTARP 11-002, EXTRAORDINARY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO CITIGROUP, INC. 4–32, 
41–44 (2011), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/Extraordinary%20Financial%20 
Assistance%20Provided%20to%20Citigroup,%20Inc.pdf;  FIN.  CRISIS  INQUIRY  COMM’N,  FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 374, 375 (Jan. 2011); Liz Moyer, Citi on Fire?, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2009, 12:00 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/13/banking-citigroup-pandit-biz-cx_lm_0113citigroup.html. 
18. FIN.  CRISIS  INQUIRY  COMM’N,  supra  note  17, at 374–75;  OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL 
INSPECTOR GEN.  FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIGTARP 10-001, EMERGENCY 
CAPITAL INJECTIONS PROVIDED TO SUPPORT THE VIABILITY OF BANK OF AMERICA, OTHER MAJOR 
BANKS, AND THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1–2, 14–31 (2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov 
/Audit%20Reports/Emergency_Capital_Injections_Provided_to_Support_the_Viability_of_Bank_of_
America.pdf; Matthew Saltmarsh, Citi To Split Itself After Posting Massive Quarterly Loss, N.Y. 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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are major players in the market for risky financial assets, like derivatives, and 
the opacity of the two banks’ derivatives exposure exacerbated market fears of 
the banks’ solvency.
19 
Bear Stearns’ earlier failure was also relevant to the regulatory reform 
impulse. Bear had failed and was merged into JP Morgan at the authorities’ 
behest in March 2008.
20 Prior to its failure, from 2004 to 2007, Bear had been 
one of the top underwriters of risky, subprime mortgage-backed securities, and 
negative reports about its mortgage exposures in early 2008 caused many of its 
clients to withdraw their investments with Bear.
21 Bear was also counterparty to 
750,000 open derivatives trades—often sitting in the middle as buyer and 
seller—with an aggregate notional value of $14.2 trillion.
22 Regulators worried 
that Bear’s failure could cause investors to question the health of other firms 
heavily invested in subprime mortgages and worried that an unwinding of 
Bear’s positions with thousands of counterparties would be chaotic, sparking an 
uncontainable chain reaction of failures.
23 
*  *  * 
After each big failure, authorities saw clearinghouses as a means to 
improve on the status quo. If a large financial institution’s risky obligations had 
gone through clearinghouses, the conventional wisdom came to hold, the 
institution might not have failed,
24 and even if it did fail, the clearinghouse 
would have diffused the costs sufficiently to avoid both the massive bailouts 
and the economic downturn that ensued. 
 
TIMES  (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/business/worldbusiness/16iht-16citi. 
19423678.html. 
19. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 17, at 24; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra 
note 11, at 25; Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME (Mar. 17, 2008), 
available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html. 
20. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34427, FINANCIAL TURMOIL: FEDERAL 
RESERVE POLICY RESPONSES 17 (2010), available at http://waxman.house.gov/sites/waxman.house 
.gov/files/documents/UploadedFiles/Fed_Policy_Responses.pdf. 
21. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 11, at 21. 
22. Id. Notional value is the gross amount referenced. If, for a fee, you promise to pay me the 
amount by which dollar-based interest rates exceed euro-based interest rates on $1 million over the 
next year, the notional amount is $1 million. 
23. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Address at the FDIC’s Forum on Mortgage 
Lending for Low and Moderate Income Households (July 8, 2008), available at  http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080708a.htm; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra 
note 11. 
24. G-20, Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit 7 (2009), available at http://ec.europa 
.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/statement_20090826_en_2.pdf (“All standardized OTC 
derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, 
and cleared through central counterparties . . . .”); cf.  MILLER,  supra  note  2, at “Summary” (The 
Congressional Research Service concludes, “Clearinghouses . . . [can] prevent any firm from building 
up a large uncapitalized exposure, as happened in the case of . . . []AIG[].”); Yesha Yadav, The 
Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO.  L.J.  387, 388–89 (2013) 
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2. Systemic Risk  
To evaluate whether clearinghouses can ameliorate systemic risk, we need 
to have a conceptualization of systemic risk in mind. The most general way to 
conceive of systemic risk is as a local but major financial failure spinning out 
of control to hurt the whole financial system first and the overall economy next. 
Classic systemic risk comes from contagion. A key institution fails and 
cannot pay its debts to other financial institutions, which in turn fail. The 
failures cascade through the interconnected financial sector.
25 Lending to the 
real economy dries up and economic activity weakens. Clearinghouses are 
thought to contain counterparty risk and any resulting contagion by assuring 
that the first failed firm’s counterparties are paid.
26 “First and foremost, the 
debate on the effects of central clearing is concentrated on counterparty risk, 
which is the expected loss sustained by the party to a contract when the other 
party fails to fulfill its obligations under the terms of the contract.”
27 “[W]ith 
adequate capitalization, the clearinghouse can reduce systemic risk by 
insulating the financial system from the failure of large participants.”
28 
Thus,  a major firm’s failure that would drag down interconnected 
financial firms is the core systemic risk that clearinghouse proponents seek to 
contain.
29 As such, I will first focus our attention in Parts II and III on how and 
whether a clearinghouse can contain it. 
Systemic risk, however, also comes via other channels, two of the most 
important of which are system-wide asset price deterioration and system-wide 
information opacity. For the first: Financial firms borrow heavily and own 
assets, such as loans and securities. If a major firm suffers an unexpected loss, 
it makes itself safer by raising new capital or by selling assets to raise cash. If it 
sells assets and its sales are big enough, then the market price for those assets 
declines. Other financial institutions with similar assets see that the value of 
their assets is falling, forcing them as well to raise new capital, lend less, or sell 
 
25. MARKUS  BRUNNERMEIER ET AL.,  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 13–24 (2009); Kaufman & Scott, supra note 3. 
26. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 25, at 55. 
27. Yee Cheng Loon & Zhaodong (Ken)  Zhong, The Impact of Central Clearing on 
Counterparty Risk, Liquidity, and Trading: Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market 1 (Nov. 15, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2176561. 
28. Squam  Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, Credit Default Swaps, 
Clearinghouses, and Exchanges 3 (Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Geoeconomic Studies, 
Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.cfr.org/financial-crises/credit-default-swaps-clearing 
houses-exchanges/p19756; Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 443–47 (2011); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 196–204 (2008). 
29. E.g., Stephen G. Cecchetti et al., Central Counterparties for Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 
BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2009, at 45 (“[I]mprove market resilience by lowering counterparty risk”); Andrew 
G. Haldane, On Counterparty Risk, 5 J. RISK MGMT. FIN. INSTITUTIONS 224 (2012); Alistair Milne, 
OTC Central Counterparty Clearing: Myths and Reality, 4 J. RISK MGMT FIN. INSTITUTIONS 335, 340 
(2012) (clearinghouses will “coordinate[] management of open positions following the failure of a 
systemically important financial institution”). 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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their own assets to raise cash. If they lower their selling prices to sell more, 
then other financial institutions’ total asset values will deteriorate and they will 
also be pushed to sell their assets. With the economy’s major financial 
institutions selling and few of them buying other than at bargain values, asset 
prices plummet and the economy suffers a financial panic.
30  Financial 
institutions can no longer channel capital through the economy. Federal 
Reserve analysts report that 
deterioration in the collateral value of borrower assets was an 
important amplification mechanism during the recent financial crisis. 
Falling asset prices caused lenders to demand more collateral, which 
caused borrowers to dump risky assets, thereby exacerbating declines 
in their market values and leading to further demands for more 
collateral . . . .
31 
Information contagion, the second additional channel, is related. For 
example, when AIG suffers visible losses, many players stop dealing with AIG. 
This freeze in finance might be limited to AIG. But if the market is opaque, 
financiers will be unsure whether, say, Citibank faces losses similar to AIG’s if 
it invested in similarly overvalued assets. The market will also be uncertain of 
the extent to which Citibank is directly exposed to AIG’s failure, because if 
AIG owes Citi too much and AIG cannot pay, then Citi could fail. Financial 
players then hesitate to deal with Citi because they cannot readily assess 
whether Citi is or is not solvent.
32 
The financial crisis suffered deeply from both a downward asset price 
spiral of collateral value and from information contagion. The current 
promoters of clearinghouses, however, focus largely on contagion risk from a 
single firm’s failure instead of these other important channels of risk. 
I return to this problem of misspecified goals after first analyzing the 
limits to clearinghouses’ capacity to contain their intended nemesis: contagion 
risk emanating from the failure of a major financial institution with extensive 
interconnected financial counterparties. Clearinghouses may well reduce 
counterparty risk. But when they do so, we must further ask, how much 
systemic risk are they reducing? 
 
30. Squam Lake Working Group, supra note 28, at 3. Proponents do not say the clearinghouse 
can contain this systemic risk. Prominent analysts say this spiral triggered the financial crisis. Gary 
Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425 (2012); 
Gaetano Antinolfi et al., Repos, Fire Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
Working Paper, WP 2012-15), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189583. 
31. James Bullard et al., Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, FED. RES. BANK 
ST. LOUIS REV., Sept./Oct. 2009, at 403, 408. For rapid asset price deterioration as a major systemic 
risk, see generally CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 142, 158–63, 216–20 (2009); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 
Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (2011). 
32. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s 
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Fund, 28 YALE J. REG. 151, 160 (2011). 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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B. A Clearinghouse Bulwark in the Crisis 
Consider AIG’s failure. To prevent it from defaulting on its obligations, 
the government injected $180 billion of aid to keep it afloat.
33 Post-failure, the 
thinking ran, AIG might not have failed, or its failure would not have been as 
consequential, if AIG’s obligations had been cleared.
34 The clearing mechanics 
are straightforward here: Financial players trade obligations with one another. 
When they use a clearinghouse, each turns the obligation over to the 
clearinghouse, which takes over both parties’ obligations. If AIG had swapped, 
say, dollars for euros with Citibank, then the clearinghouse would take over 
(“novate,” in the industry vocabulary) the dollars-for-euros trade and would 
have become obliged to pay the contracted-for euros to AIG and the contracted-
for dollars to Citibank. Both AIG and Citibank would owe the clearinghouse 
the corresponding amounts. 
Had AIG cleared its trades, then the clearinghouse could have sought 
collateral from AIG upfront, when the trade came to the clearinghouse. A 
clearinghouse would have watched AIG, understood its deteriorating condition 
and the declining value of its trades, and, in the conventional post-crisis 
narrative, required it to post more collateral earlier.
35 Even if it were blindsided 
by AIG’s deterioration, as was the market overall, the clearinghouse could have 
called on  AIG-posted collateral, as well as the capital posted by the other 
members and the obligations owed to AIG by the clearinghouse for transactions 
that had turned out to be profitable for AIG. A clearinghouse would have 
intercepted those amounts owed to AIG before they went to AIG and given 
their value to the clearinghouse members. 
Using the collateral and capital in its own hands, as well as the value the 
clearinghouse owed to AIG, the clearinghouse could have quickly made good 
on AIG’s underlying obligations—so  the conventional thinking runs. 
Contagion and a deep financial crisis would have arguably been averted. As 
one review of the regulatory work thus far reports: “A global consensus has 
emerged among financial market regulators that [credit default swaps] should 
be . . . centrally cleared . . . .”
36 (Ironically, although AIG’s derivatives failures 
induced regulatory confidence in clearing, the understanding now among the 
 
33. Timothy G. Massad, Infographic: Overall $182 Billion Committed to Stabilize AIG During 
the Financial Crisis Is Now Fully Recovered,  U.S.  DEP’T OF TREASURY  (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/aig-182-billion.aspx. 
34. Yadav, supra note 24, at 421. 
35. Whether the new clearinghouses will manage counterparty risk by eyeing the riskiness of 
the member firm, or by only examining the riskiness of the cleared trade, is as of now uncertain. 
Traditional clearinghouses have done the latter more than the former. 
36. Richard A. Miller, Editorial, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Apr. 2009, at 3; see also 
Simon Boughey, After Bear Stearns Scare, Fed Pushes Banks to Form Central Clearing House for 
CDS Market, EUROWEEK, June 13, 2008, at 64; Stephen G. Cecchetti et al., supra note 29, at 45–46, 
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best thinkers on the subject is that AIG’s derivatives were too complex to 
clear.
37) 
Similarly, the Federal Reserve’s chair, Ben Bernanke, worried that 
unwinding Bear’s bilateral, uncleared positions would have been chaotic.
38 
Hence, the Fed induced Bear to be merged into JP Morgan.
39  Shortly 
afterwards, Timothy Geithner, then heading New York’s Federal Reserve 
Bank, urged banks to create a central clearinghouse for credit default swaps.
40 
Financial firms decided that they should pursue a centralized clearinghouse as a 
“risk-reducing effort[] within the [financial] industry.”
41  “[R]egulators . . . 
touted the value of clearing houses as a way to safeguard the financial system 
from the catastrophic effects of another Lehman-style default.”
42 
Bills to require clearinghouses arose in Congress,
43  the Treasury 
concurred,
44 and the pro-clearinghouse consensus culminated in Dodd-Frank’s 
command to regulators to establish clearinghouses for credit default swaps and 
similar risky trades. Section 723 of Dodd-Frank showed the legislators’ 
confidence in clearinghouses, mandating: “It shall be unlawful for any person 
to engage in a swap unless that person submits such swap for clearing to a 
derivatives clearing organization  . . . .”
45  The statute sought “mitigation of 
systemic risk” via derivatives clearing organizations.
46 The chief regulator of 
the American derivatives markets said that “to stop another derivatives 
inferno,” these risky instruments must “be brought to clearing houses. Clearing 
houses . . . guarantee the obligations of both parties. Transactions are moved 
 
37. See Darrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 67 
(2010). 
38. Yalman Onaran, Fed Aided Bear Stearns as Firm Faced Chapter 11, Bernanke Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a7coicTh 
gaEE; Bernanke, supra note 23. 
39. LABONTE, supra note 20, at 17. 
40. PETER  NORMAN,  THE  RISK  CONTROLLERS:  CENTRAL  COUNTERPARTY  CLEARING IN 
GLOBALISED FINANCIAL MARKETS 222–25, 285–87, 291, 297 (2011); Chander & Costa, supra note 
13, at 663. 
41. See COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP, CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISK: 
THE  ROAD TO REFORM  126 (2008), available at  http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/docs/CRMPG 
-III.pdf. 
42. Jeremy Grant, Push to Underpin Clearing House Foundations, FT.COM (June 7, 2010), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d6dce68-725a-11df-9f82-00144feabdc0.html. 
43. Chander & Costa, supra note 13, at 672–73. 
44. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION, 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, Regulatory Reform of Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives (May 13, 2009), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg129.aspx; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Outlines Framework for Regulatory Reform: Provides New Rules of 
the Road, Focuses First on Containing Systemic Risk (Mar. 26, 2009),  available at  http://www 
.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg72.aspx. 
45. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 723(a)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–76 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
46. Id. (adding 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1)(D)(ii)(III), which states that in constructing clearinghouses, 
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off the books of derivatives dealers, which are part of financial institutions that 
may be . . . ‘too big to fail’  and . . . on to those of well-regulated central 
counter-parties.”
47 Another commissioner put clearinghouses at the top of a list 
of ways to ameliorate systemic risk, because they “mutualiz[e] credit risks.”
48 
Congress’s investigatory arm concluded: “[A] clearinghouse . . . can limit 
counterparty credit risk by absorbing counterparty defaults and preventing 
transmission of their impacts to other market participants.”
49 The regulatory 
consensus decidedly favors clearinghouses conceptually, and has now turned to 
implementation. 
The Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)—three of the country’s 
major financial regulators—are working on risk-management standards for 
clearinghouses, such as their collateral rules. The CFTC has finalized the 
review process for determining which swaps must be centrally cleared.
50 The 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New  York, with substantial 
responsibilities for implementing the clearinghouse mechanisms for 
derivatives, wants derivatives to move through clearinghouses to stabilize 
financial markets.
51 Timothy Geithner, when he was Secretary of the Treasury, 
put clearinghouses for derivatives at the top of his list of financial infrastructure 
fixes for the fractures that the financial crisis revealed.
52 
Regulators around the world saw the need for clearinghouses similarly.
53 
The British Treasury concluded that “[clearinghouses] can impose consistent 
 
47. Gary Gensler, How  To Stop Another Derivatives Inferno,  FT.COM  (Feb. 24, 2010), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3b52b642-217c-11df-830e-00144feab49a.html#axzz1nmEBFEAt;  see 
also Gary Gensler, Chairman, Comm. Fut. Trading Comm’n, Remarks to the Council of Institutional 
Investors: Over-the-Counter Derivatives Reform (Apr. 13, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov 
/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-38.  
48. Jill E. Sommers, Comm’r, Comm. Fut. Trading Comm’n, Remarks to the Capital Markets 
Consortium: Clearinghouses as Mitigators of Systemic Risk (Sept. 30, 2010),  available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opasommers-10. 
49. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-397T, SYSTEMIC RISK: REGULATORY 
OVERSIGHT AND RECENT INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS RISK POSED BY CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 21 
(2009) (Statement of Orice M. Williams, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09397t.pdf; cf. Dwight Cass, Good 
Idea, Not in Practice, BREAKINGVIEWS.COM (Feb. 20, 2009) (“[The] financial stock meltdown put 
new impetus behind the drive for a central clearinghouse for credit default swaps.”). 
50. Testimony of Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Before 
U.S. H. Comm. on Agric. (Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/sites/republicans 
.agriculture.house.gov/files/pdf/hearings/Gensler120229.pdf. 
51. William Dudley, How We Will Stop Derivatives Magnifying Future Crises, FT.COM (Apr. 
15, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b47b8f00-8555-11e1-a75a-00144feab49a.html#axzz2OwyP 
P1Ap. 
52. See  Timothy  F.  Geithner,  Pres. & CEO Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the 
Economic Club of New York: Reducing Systemic Risk in a Dynamic Financial System (June 9, 2008), 
available at http://www.bis.org/review/r080612b.pdf. 
53. Proposal  for a  Regulation  of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC 
Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, at 14, COM (2010) 484/5, available at 
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and robust risk management practices . . . . [G]reater use of [clearinghouses] 
can . . . reduce systemic risk.”
54 “At the EU level . . . [clearinghouses] for all 
classes of . . .  derivatives ha[ve] been [sought] with enthusiasm.”
55  The 
European Union’s post-crisis financial reforms demanded central clearing.
56 
The 2009, crisis-influenced G20 conference of the world’s twenty largest 
economies concluded that clearinghouses for modern financial products were 
vital and must be built by the end of 2012.
57 
There is thus considerable regulatory activity, much of it based on a 
highly optimistic sense of what a clearinghouse can do to reduce systemic risk. 
 
II. 
WHAT A CLEARINGHOUSE CAN DO 
  Before examining clearinghouses’ limited capacity to reduce systemic risk, 
consider first how they provide economic value, via trading efficiencies, 
particularly in normal times. 
Clearinghouses can smoothly sort out and compress a tangle of trades. 
They can enhance price transparency and require standardization, thereby 
expanding the size of the market for the product traded. They make trading 
more efficient and narrow dealer profits. They make it easier for new firms to 
trade the cleared instrument, thereby enhancing competition. They centralize 
collecting collateral, can be the locus of regulation to assure strong collateral 
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Management Practices (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Working Paper 
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/finance/public-debt/49931920.pdf. 
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www.g20.org/load/780988012  (“[S]tandardized OTC derivatives contracts should be traded on 
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posts for risky trades, can mutualize losses among the clearinghouse members, 
and can even,  in principle, adjust collateral posting levels by assessing 
counterparty risk. The clearinghouse offsets obligations to a failing financial 
institution—profitable transactions that are assets of the failed institution—
against the failing institution’s debts to the clearinghouse, allowing other 
participants to collect a greater share of the failed institution’s value. Further 
explanation follows. 
A. Standardizing and Price Transparency 
Many financial markets are opaque. An occasional trader is likely 
unaware of the average price for similar transactions and, uninformed, can 
overpay. A repeat trader knows more and can better assess if an offered price is 
too low or too high. This experienced trader turns its knowledge of the market 
into a stream of value. In such informationally opaque markets, spreads widen 
between the occasional trader’s buying price and another occasional trader’s 
selling price, with experienced, knowledgeable traders profiting from the wide 
spreads.
58 
In contrast, a clearinghouse can make pricing public. It uses standardized 
financial products and can report trades regularly. Standardization facilitates 
price comparison for occasional traders,
59 inducing regulars to sharpen their 
pricing, narrowing the spread between what they pay and what they charge for 
the same deal. Because a clearinghouse with public pricing gives outsiders the 
same information as the regular traders, spreads narrow. Trading becomes less 
expensive. 
B. Centralizing Counterparty Risk Assessment 
Many financial trades are open-ended, meaning that the size of a trader’s 
obligation shifts with market prices until the trade matures and the trader pays 
up. The party at risk wants to be protected if its trading partner—its 
counterparty—cannot pay. To manage this risk of counterparty insolvency, the 
traders post collateral. 
1. Trading Advantages of Centralization 
For a trader to know how much collateral it needs from its counterparty, it 
must assess both the deal’s market value and the counterparty’s credit quality. 
The trade might be profitable on paper, but if the counterparty cannot pay up, 
the winner cannot collect its profits. Traders thus have reason to pay attention 
 
58. E.g., Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell, Markets:  Transparency and the 
Corporate Bond Market, 22 J.  ECON.  PERSP. 217 (2008); Richard  C. Green et al.,  Financial 
Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 275 (2007). 
59. Lester  G.  Telser & Harlow  N.  Higinbotham,  Organized Futures Markets: Costs and 
Benefits, 85 J. POL. ECON. 969 (1977); Lester G. Telser, Why There Are Organized Futures Markets, 
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to one another’s solvency. A centralized clearing organization, the thinking 
runs, is the best way to pay attention, by putting the task on the clearinghouse 
and  not the traders. A single centralized player evaluates whether more 
collateral is needed and what collateralization formula to use.
60  The 
clearinghouse can use mechanical collateral rules, requiring collateral based on 
the trade, not the creditworthiness of the counterparty. Either way, total 
assessment costs decline.
61 (Critics could wonder—Craig Pirrong makes the 
following point effectively and was the first to do so
62—whether the 
clearinghouse would do any better than credit rating agencies’ personnel, who 
mistakenly thought for too long that America’s core financial institutions were 
robust, when they were not.
63) 
2. Regulatory Advantages of Centralization 
Centralization can facilitate sound regulation. When trading is dispersed, 
regulators cannot readily see the system’s aggregate risk taking. Centralized 
clearing, the thinking runs, opens a clearer window for regulators into the 
market and its firms. The regulator can examine the clearinghouse’s books to 
see who owes how much to whom. The information in a clearinghouse’s books 
could help regulators make better-informed policy judgments, it is thought. 
C. Centralizing Collateral Collection 
Similarly, centralized collateral holding could make trading cheaper and 
safer. If AIG, for example, had traded through a clearinghouse, the 
clearinghouse would have required AIG to post collateral to cover its trades. 
Some trades would have been profitable to AIG, freeing collateral backing up 
 
60. Says the CFTC’s chair, “Central clearing . . . democratizes the market by eliminating the 
need for market participants to individually determine counterparty credit risk, as now clearinghouses 
stand between buyers and sellers.” Silla Brush, Dodd-Frank Swap-Clearing Rule Gets CFTC Final 
Approval,  BLOOMBERG  (Nov. 29, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-
28/cftc-said-to-have-votes-to-complete-swap-clearing-requirement.html.  
61. Robert R. Bliss & Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and Settlement: A 
Comparison of Central Counterparties and Alternative Structures,  ECON.  PERSP.,  Fourth Quarter 
2006, at 22, 26. 
62. Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, 31 REGULATION 44, 48, 51 (2008); see also 
Bruno Biais et al., Incentive Compatible Centralized Clearing, BANQUE DE FRANCE FIN. STABILITY 
REV., Apr. 2013, at 161. 
63. A clearinghouse that works according to mechanical rules will require collateral based on 
its members’ average creditworthiness. It would require a future AIG of 2018 to post collateral, a 
better result than counterparties requiring no collateral from an overrated AIG in 2008. But the AIG of 
2018 would still underpost, because the mechanical clearinghouse would assess based on average 
counterparty risk, when AIG would be below average. Stronger players would not want the average 
assessment raised, because then they would have to post more collateral, which would be costly to 
them. And the clearinghouse personnel could mistakenly assess the average as lower than it really is, 
particularly since the members’ incentives are to encourage low collateral posting. 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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those trades to bolster the other trades on which AIG had lost money and which 
it had trouble paying off.
64 
Transparency and collateral interact. Some clearinghouse proponents 
argue that the financial crisis was exacerbated because, as the president of the 
New York Fed said, “market participants[,] [unable] to assess the true health of 
other financial firms[, . . .] demand[ed] more collateral [than necessary] or . . . 
move[d] their trades at the first sign of trouble.”
65  A well-functioning 
clearinghouse would have demanded good collateral before a crisis. The well-
collateralized clearinghouse would then have made good on the trades that the 
failed firm missed. 
D. Mutualizing Risk 
Clearinghouse members also post capital to the clearinghouse upfront. 
This pooled capital becomes a guarantee fund for the cleared trades, spreading 
the risks of trading failure across the members.
66 This risk spreading would 
conceivably stop the first domino from falling. Or, if it falls anyway, the costs 
of its failure could be dissipated by multiple financial institutions taking a piece 
of the risk and small part of the loss. (A counterpoint is that the risks could 
exceed the clearinghouse’s capital. The government poured $180 billion into 
AIG, for example, to cover AIG’s obligations and no clearinghouse will have 
that level of capitalization. CME, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, is a large 
financial operation that is expected to take on many of the new clearing 
mandates through subsidiaries, but even it has only $20 billion in capital 
overall.
67) Mutualization is a major articulated benefit of the clearinghouse. 
E. Netting 
Regulators want clearinghouse participants to benefit from netting. The 
netting principle is simple. Consider first its mechanics and its transactional 
advantages. 
 
64. However, most industry analysts who tout the advantages of centralized collateral do not 
focus on its capacity to have more collateral available to cover failed trades, but on clearinghouse 
participants posting less collateral. The traders want the clearinghouse to free up collateral, while 
keeping the overall level of risk unchanged. See, e.g., NORMAN, supra note 40, at 16. They want 
centralized collateral pooling not to reduce public, systemic risk, but to capture private benefits by 
reducing the size of their collateral postings. See id.  
65. Dudley, supra note 51.  
66. JON  GREGORY,  COUNTERPARTY  CREDIT  RISK:  THE  NEW  CHALLENGE FOR GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 377 (2010). 
67. CME  GROUP,  INC.,  ANNUAL  REPORT  PURSUANT TO SECTION  13  OR  15(D)  OF THE 
SECURITIES  EXCHANGE  ACT OF 1934  (FORM  10-K),  at  33  (Mar. 1, 2013),  available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1156375/000115637513000007/cme-2012123110k.htm. Half 
of that amount, aggregating CME’s contributed capital, members’ guarantees, and clearinghouse 
assessment strength, backs up the clearinghouse operations. CME  GROUP,  INC.,  CME  CLEARING 
FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS 19 (2012), available at http://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/files/financial 
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Posit  that  AIG has obligations running both to it and from it. The 
obligations running to it are assets of AIG. Bank of America owes AIG $1 
billion, while AIG owes Bear Stearns $1 billion. If the debts were handled one 
by one, Bank of America would pay $1 billion to AIG and then Bear would try 
to collect $1 billion from AIG. In reality however, Bear would face off against 
other creditors of AIG also clamoring for a piece of the $1 billion AIG just 
obtained from Bank of America. As a result, AIG, itself in free fall, could not 
readily and fully pay the $1 billion to Bear Stearns. AIG’s failure to pay would 
weaken Bear and, if that were the $1 billion that broke Bear’s back, it would in 
turn fail after AIG. Contagion would spread. Worse yet, the funds may be stuck 
inside the weakened institution as its counterparties litigate to get their share. 
The clearinghouse should stabilize this chain of obligations. Before the 
financial crisis weakened AIG, the clearinghouse would have taken over Bear’s 
claim on AIG and AIG’s claim on Bank of America. The clearinghouse would 
smoothly obtain the $1 billion from Bank of America. If the clearinghouse then 
turned that $1 billion over to AIG, AIG would use it for all of its creditors, not 
just Bear. But the clearinghouse would instead write a $1 billion check directly 
to Bear Stearns, which, having readily obtained the cash when it cashed the 
check (or obtained the wire transfer), would not be threatened. Nor would Bear 
have to wait to collect a diminished amount from AIG outside of the 
clearinghouse, via a lawsuit or AIG’s bankruptcy, with the funds not available 
for months or years. Contagion from AIG’s failure would be cleanly contained 
in the clearinghouse. One domino (AIG) falls, but the entire row does not.  
Hence, clearinghouse proponents claim, a well-run clearinghouse would 
be critically important for controlling counterparty risk arising from  risky 
trading in too-big-to-fail derivatives markets.
68  Similarly, traders may hold 
winning and losing positions with several different counterparties. Each 
position could involve a huge sum of money, but they together could net out to 
zero. Netting could settle these transactions out quickly, without waiting for 
slow settlements, lawsuits, and even bankruptcies. 
Posit three firms owing one another $1 billion, as in Figure 1, below. Each 
awaits payment from another before it can pay the third. AIG needs $1 billion 
from Bank of America so that it can pay Bear. But Bear needs the $1 billion 
that AIG owes it so that Bear can pay Bank of America. Since the claims and 
 
68. A group of major economists, each influential in policy circles, identify this feature of 
netting as the most attractive systemic virtue of clearing credit default swaps. Squam Lake Working 
Group, supra note 28, at 3:  
Suppose, to pick an ideal example, that Dealer A has an exposure on credit derivatives to 
Dealer B of $1 billion . . . . That is, if Dealer B fails, then A would lose $1 billion. Likewise, 
B has an exposure to Dealer C of $1 billion, and C has an exposure to A of $1 billion. 
Without a clearinghouse, default by A, B, or C leads to a loss of $1 billion [by one of the 
other two]. With clearing, however, the positive and negative exposures of each 
counterparty cancel, and each poses no risk to anyone, including the clearinghouse. 
Id. Keep an eye on the phrasing that cancelling “poses no risk to anyone,” which I return to below. It 
poses no risk to “anyone” inside the clearinghouse, but poses risks to major players outside it. 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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the obligations are with differing parties, the bilateral trades cannot readily be 
closed out simultaneously. 
Compressing those positions one by one can be clumsy. Each party wants 
to be paid before it pays, inducing gridlock. A clearinghouse manages 
multilateral obligations better than ad hoc settlements,
69 turning the triangle 
into a set of balanced claims and assets inside the clearinghouse. No unstable 
financial firm has to wait for another to pay it before it can make good on its 
own obligations. In principle, the clearinghouse can provide certainty and 
liquidity on these triangular transactions. 
 
FIGURE 1: The triangular problem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  *  * 
This transactional efficiency, especially the narrowing of dealer mark-ups 
due to transparency and the quicker settlement due to netting, can be worth 
pursuing as a matter of general economic efficiency. But that inside-the-
clearinghouse focus is too narrow a regulatory focus for evaluating systemic 
risk. As we see next in Part III, if a fourth systemically important creditor, say 
Citibank or a major money market fund, is owed substantial sums outside of the 
clearinghouse by one of the clearinghouse members, then the clearinghouse 
will silently weaken Citibank and the other outsiders. 
 
III. 
WHAT A CLEARINGHOUSE CANNOT DO 
To see why clearinghouses’  capacity to contain systemic risk is more 
limited than is commonly thought,  we first examine the setoff problem in 
bankruptcy scholarship. We see how setoff’s principal effect is to transfer risk 
without eliminating it. This thinking parallels one of modern finance’s core 
understandings, the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) capital structure irrelevance 
proposition. 
 
69. Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 61, at 26. 
$1 billion owed to AIG  $1 billion due from Bear  
Liabilities  Assets 
Bank of America’s balance sheet 
AIG owes Bear $1 billion 
 
Bank of America 
Bank owes AIG $1 billion 
AIG 
 Bear owes Bank $1 billion 
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First, I examine this analytic for its own sake and systematize the structure 
of clearinghouses’ systemic pros and cons, including limitations not previously 
highlighted or seen. Then, building on these risk transfer principles, I show that 
some objections already made to clearinghouses’ purported capacity to handle 
systemic risk, as well as those new difficulties that I add to the analysis, are 
analogous to the M-M capital structure problem, in that each benefit is offset, 
often in full, by this risk transfer principle. Thus, I demonstrate that the 
clearinghouses’  capacity to ensure good collateral posting is largely a risk 
transfer feature, not a risk elimination feature. Next, I show that the purported 
benefit of clearinghouse  mutualization of counterparty risk is offset by 
clearinghouses’  potential to gather, focus, and funnel otherwise discrete 
counterparty risks into a systemically dangerous hyper-interconnected network. 
Finally, I show that these purported benefits, as well  as some other real 
benefits, largely fail to dent the actual, serious, and more substantive systemic 
risks that afflicted the financial system in the last crisis—namely, asset price 
deterioration and financial opacity. Indeed, clearinghouses are as likely  to 
worsen these systemic risks as to ameliorate them. 
A. Transferring Losses, Without Eliminating Risks: Collateral Collection 
A bankrupt company cannot choose to pay some debts and not others. The 
Bankruptcy Code commands it to stop paying its creditors and commands its 
creditors to stop seeking to be repaid, as the bankrupt is too poor to pay them 
all.
70 (Creditors are “stayed,” in the bankruptcy vocabulary.) Then the bankrupt 
gathers its assets, whose value is then distributed to its highest priority creditors 
first and its next-highest priority creditors second, and so on, until a last layer 
can be paid only proportionately.
71 
But, for some pre-bankruptcy financial contracts, if the debtor has put up 
collateral, the creditor can immediately take that collateral in satisfaction of the 
debt, without waiting for the bankruptcy process to reorganize the debtor.
72 The 
risk transfer principle should be immediately clear when one examines the 
clearinghouse’s improved ability to collect collateral that is one of the major 
advantages advanced for clearinghouses. Proponents claim that the clearing-
house, by using standard collateral-requirement formulas, will more effectively 
collect collateral from derivatives traders than the market does generally. The 
argument is that mechanized, centralized collateral posts in a clearinghouse will 
lead to the clearinghouse having more collateral than a decentralized market. 
While a clearinghouse member that posts collateral to the clearinghouse 
lowers the clearinghouse’s exposure to the extent of the collateral, it 
concomitantly exposes other financial firms with which the member deals to 
 
70. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Title 11 of the United States Code is hereinafter referred to as the 
“Bankruptcy Code”). 
71. Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b). 
72. Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(17). 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
1664  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 101:1641 
more risk. The collateral available to one creditor, namely, the clearinghouse, is 
value denied to other creditors. Once the collateral has been posted to the 
clearinghouse, it is unavailable to others. The difference is therefore zero-sum. 
The clearinghouse wins, but  someone else loses. If that someone else is 
systemically unimportant, systemic risk is reduced. But if that someone else is 
systemically vital, then the clearinghouse has only moved around systemic risk, 
not reduced it. Below, I show real world manifestations of this problem in Part 
IV.B and in Figure 9, with the clearinghouse moving systemic risk away from 
its members and into the systemically vital money market. 
The real-world amounts involved are not small. Current estimates are that 
the clearinghouse and related rules for noncleared derivatives will require 
between $2 trillion and $10 trillion in additional collateral, with the rules 
requiring that the collateral be high quality. Some have argued that this shift 
will starve the rest of the world’s financial markets  of these high quality 
assets.
73 But what is not yet realized is that these outside markets will thereby 
be subjected to greater risk when denied access to those high quality assets, 
because the collateral will be sitting at the clearinghouse. This does not imply 
that the clearinghouse will increase systemic risk through this channel, but it 
does suggest that it is not decreasing systemic risk, but moving it elsewhere. 
B. Transferring Losses, While Only Partially Reducing Risks: Complex Setoff 
In this Section, I examine a scenario more complex than simple collateral 
posting. A creditor can apply funds due to it from the bankrupt-debtor, 
regardless of where the creditor sits in the priority ranking.
74 It can set off a 
debt it owes to the bankrupt with a debt due from the bankrupt. Setoff turns two 
collection efforts into a single transaction. If the debtor is solvent, its other 
creditors are unaffected. Setoff is well known to bankruptcy analysts to be 
distributionally innocuous and transactionally efficient when the firm is not 
bankrupt, but it is equally well known (in bankruptcy circles, both classic
75 and 
current
76) to have sharp distributional consequences if the debtor is bankrupt. 
Setoff compresses a set—or ring, or triangle—of related transactions, 
 
73. Ralph Atkins, Crunch Feared if Collateral Rules Enforced: New Clearing Regulations 
Could Suck in $10tn of Safe Assets, FT.COM (Feb. 5, 2013), www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e7737740-6f85-
11e2-b906-00144feab49a.html (the $2 trillion number comes from an IMF researcher; the $10 trillion 
estimate comes from ISDA). 
74. Bankruptcy Code § 553. 
75. James Angell McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 583, 
600–04 (1927).  
76. BARRY E. ADLER ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 387–88 (4th ed. 2007); MARGARET HOWARD & 
PETER A. ALCES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 550–56 (2d ed. 2001) (excerpting Elcona 
Homes, discussed infra in text accompanying note 82); ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 442 
(5th ed. 1999) (“[I]n bankruptcy, [setoff] produces results that fly in the face of the equality-of-
distribution rule that we saw as the backbone of preference law.”); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY 
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 
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effectively giving each member a security interest—collateral—in the amounts 
the debtor owes to the others. It can grab the amounts owed others to satisfy 
claims owed to itself. By doing so, it can hasten settlement. Clearinghouses do 
this compression on a wholesale basis. This setoff compression is thought to 
also be a major advantage of the clearinghouse. 
I decompose  compression’s effects in this Section into de facto 
collateralization and a collapsing of claims, showing that a major portion of the 
benefit is the clearinghouse taking a de facto security interest—collateral—that 
transfers the risk of loss to the outside money market, which may well be 
systemically vital too. Again, Part IV.B and Figure 9 will illustrate this transfer 
of loss and risk in real-world terms. 
Let’s first see how setoff effectively embeds the risk transfer of 
collateralization, a feature bankruptcy analysts  have long understood. 
Thereafter, I will apply the concept to clearinghouses. 
Collier, long the most widely used bankruptcy treatise, informs the reader 
that  “recognizing the right [of setoff] in bankruptcy often means that the 
creditor holding the right will . . . recover a greater percentage of his or her 
claim as compared to other creditors who have no similar entitlement.”
77 
Another treatise says the same: “the creditor with a setoff right is paid in full to 
the extent of that right, instead of the percentage dividend payable to general 
creditors.”
78 Some bankruptcy analysts see setoff as justified, some see it as 
inappropriate; but both sides well understand that it alters priority among 
creditors. 
Setoff’s distributional impact can be demonstrated by a brief hypothetical. 
Posit that the Debtor, D, owes $100 to A, and A in turn owes D $100. If setoff 
were not in play, D would collect the $100 from A, and A would then have a 
$100 claim on D. If D had no other creditors, D would write the $100 check out 
to A, as in Figure 2. But if A can invoke setoff, before paying D back, then the 
obligations between A and D would balance out, and neither would have to pay 
the other. Claims would be settled out with less paperwork than otherwise. 
 
FIGURE 2: Basic setoff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 
2011) (footnote omitted). 
78. CHARLES  JORDAN  TABB,  THE  LAW OF BANKRUPTCY  166 (1997);  accord  DAVID  L. 
BUCHBINDER, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY 190 (1990). 
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Now conceptualize setoff more abstractly: For the debtor, money due 
from a creditor is an asset, potentially available to all of the debtor’s creditors. 
But, through setoff law, creditor A can itself pay off its own obligation to D by 
using D’s obligation to A. No third party is hurt when D is solvent. 
But if D is insolvent and has creditors besides A, then the distributional 
consequence changes sharply. Without setoff, creditor A would be paid ratably 
with  D’s other creditors. But with setoff, D’s other creditors will be 
disappointed. If some creditors can set off while other creditors cannot, the 
favored creditors’ ability to set off affects the priority between otherwise equal 
creditors. Consider Figure 3. The debtor owes $100 to each of two creditors, A1 
and  B. But it has only one asset, worth $100—the $100 that a solvent 
Counterparty A2 owes it: 
 
FIGURE 3: Multiple parties, with no setoff 
The insolvent debtor, D, owes creditors more than the $100 it owns. The 
trustee of the bankrupt debtor, D, normally gathers the bankrupt’s assets and 
then distributes them proportionately to the creditors. The trustee in D’s 
bankruptcy would obtain the $100 from A2 and then distribute it ratably to A1 
and B, each of whom would receive $50. 
Next, collapse A1 and A2 into a single creditor, A, as in Figure 4, with 
mutual obligations running from A to D:  
 
FIGURE 4: Multiple parties, with setoff 
D’s only asset is the obligation it owns from A to pay over $100. Without 
setoff A would deliver $100 to D. Then, with D having $100, A and B would 
each receive $50, or 50 percent of what D owes them. That is, A would receive 
back only $50, representing the proportion of D’s assets ($100) to its total debts 
($200). B would also get $50 in D’s bankruptcy. But if A can set off, then it 
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nets its $100 obligation to D against D’s $100 obligation back to A. A would 
pay nothing, obtaining $100 of value from D. B would receive nothing from D, 
as D would have no assets after A’s setoff. Although A and B each had equal-
sized unsecured claims, setoff allows A to gain priority over B. 
Setoff externalizes the risks between A and D onto B. If A1 and A2, from 
Figure 3, could unite their claims, they also could externalize the risk of D 
failing to pay, onto B. Collapsing A1  and  A2  into a single creditor, A, is 
financially equivalent to making A into a clearinghouse for A1 and A2. 
Conceptualize A’s setoff right as A having a security interest in its own 
obligation to the debtor. (Secured creditors are paid out of their security before 
anyone else.) The creditor’s setoff right resembles a secured creditor’s right to 
the debtor’s account receivable. The security interest is the $100 account 
receivable from the creditor itself. And the usual scholarly rationale for setoff is 
just that—it’s convenient and it resembles a security interest.
79 
Consider this excerpt from Professor John McCoid’s  Setoff: Why 
Bankruptcy Priority? on setoff law’s impact in transferring, not eliminating, 
risk among creditors: 
Between solvent parties, setoff makes perfect sense. If you owe me 
$10 and I owe you $7, it is certainly efficient for you simply to pay me 
$3 . . . . Striking that balance affects no one else. If, however, one of us 
is insolvent and has other creditors, the sense of this solution is less 
obvious. It is hardly news that setoff . . . is preferential in effect. A 
creditor who owes money to his debtor [is fully paid to the extent it 
owes the debtor money], while other creditors receive less.
80 
Other bankruptcy scholars are in accord,
81 as is the Seventh Circuit, per 
Judge Posner: 
[A]n unsecured creditor fortunate enough to owe his debtor as much 
as . . . the debtor owes him can . . . receive 100 cents on the dollar, 
while the other unsecured creditors, who have nothing to set off 
against the debtor, might be lucky to collect 10 cents on the dollar. The 
difference in treatment seems based on a fortuitous difference among 
the unsecured creditors, and therefore arbitrary. . . . [Setoff] advance[s] 
 
79. John C. McCoid, II, Setoff: Why Bankruptcy Priority?, 75 VA. L. REV. 15, 32–39 (1989); 
McLaughlin, supra note 75, at 600–04.  
80. McCoid, supra note 79, at 15.  
81. See,  e.g., D.E. Murray, Banks Versus Creditors of Their Customers: Set-Offs Against 
Customers’ Accounts, 82 COM. L.J. 449, 464 (1977); Note, Setoff in Bankruptcy: Is the Creditor 
Preferred or Secured?, 50 U.  COLO.  L.  REV. 511 (1979).  Bankruptcy bars preferential eve-of-
bankruptcy payments that favor some creditors over others. Such payments are recalled during the 
bankruptcy proceeding, to be shared proportionately among all unsecured creditors, not just the 
favored one. Bankruptcy Code § 547. 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
1668  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 101:1641 
one unsecured creditor over another merely because the first happens 
also to owe money to their common debtor.
82 
Again, setoff is not necessarily poor policy. Scholars and judges 
understand that it favors some and disfavors others, splitting over whether this 
is wise or unwise.
83  Proponents do not argue that the efficiencies—settling 
mutual debts in a single transaction—reduce risk. Rather, it redistributes losses. 
Sitting by itself, setoff makes what may be innocuous distributional 
reconfigurations and compresses two transactions into one. In the clearinghouse 
it may do the same. Whether its basic risk transfer character can arrest systemic 
risk in any major way, however, has yet to be seen. 
 
FIGURE 5: Inserting a clearinghouse into the multiple party,  
bilateral market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moving Figure 3’s A-to-D bilateral transactions into a clearinghouse yields the above 
scenario. A1 no longer depends on D for payment, but looks to the clearinghouse. The 
$100 debt from A2 to D becomes an asset of the clearinghouse, fully available to A1, 
but not available even in part to B, who is outside, on the far right in the figure. 
 
82. In re  Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1988). Posner says that any 
rationale for setoff comes from the setoff beneficiary being like a secured creditor, with the debt to the 
creditor acting like the security. Id. at 485. 
83. See, e.g., Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (“The right of setoff . . . 
allows entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each other, thereby 
avoiding ‘the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A.’”) (quoting Studley v. Boylston Nat’l 
Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913)). 
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C. Clearinghouses as Risk Transfer Writ Large 
Now consider the bilateral transactions from Figure 3. There, D owes each 
of A1 and B $100. If D fails, A1 and B are at risk. But if all of the A1, A2, and D 
trades had been moved into the clearinghouse, then A1  would look to the 
clearinghouse to be paid, not to D. The clearinghouse can cover for its 
members the payments that a weakened D could not make. Figure 5 illustrates. 
1. Without Setoff, Without a Clearinghouse  
Move the clearinghouse scenario from abstract As and Ds to real-world 
institutions. A weak financial institution—make it Bank of America (“BoA”)—
loses money and becomes insolvent. BoA has a contract with an insurer, say, 
AIG, on which it owes AIG $1 billion. BoA also has a contract with, say, Bear 
Stearns, on which Bear owes BoA $1 billion. 
If the money moves outside of a clearinghouse, as in Figures 1, 2, and 3, 
above, BoA must pay AIG $1 billion directly. If it cannot pay, AIG may fail. 
True, BoA has a readily available asset of $1 billion, namely the monies that 
Bear owes it. But even if Bear is solvent enough to pay up, that $1 billion flows 
first to BoA, which must use that $1 billion to pay all of its creditors, not just 
AIG. Depending on the extent of BoA’s other obligations, its failure could well 
lead to AIG’s failing as well. 
2. With Setoff, but Without a Clearinghouse 
If the monies due to BoA were instead due from AIG (and not from Bear), 
then AIG could in effect collect the $1 billion from BoA. AIG would set off the 
$1 billion it owed BoA against the $1 billion BoA owed it. AIG would not have 
to pay out the $1 billion and would thus be insulated from BoA’s failure. 
 
FIGURE 6: AIG’s hypothetical setoff with Bank of America 
 
 
3. With a Clearinghouse, Which Institutionalizes Wide, De Facto Setoff  
Next, move the AIG, BoA, and Bear triangle into a clearinghouse. Bear 
owes the clearinghouse, not BoA, $1 billion. The strong clearinghouse, not the 
weakened BoA, owes $1 billion to AIG. The clearinghouse owes BoA $1 
billion (from the original Bear-to-BoA debt) but BoA also owes the 
clearinghouse $1 billion (from the original BoA-to-AIG debt). The 
clearinghouse sets off its symmetrical obligations to and from BoA, netting 
them down to zero. It collects $1 billion from Bear and uses that $1 billion to 
pay AIG. If the impact stopped there, the clearinghouse would, as advertised, 
have reduced systemic risk, justifying the regulatory energy put into its 
construction. 
Owes AIG $1B 
Owes BoA $1B 
AIG  Bank of America 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
1670  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 101:1641 
FIGURE 7: The clearinghouse stabilizes AIG 
In this scenario, moving the triangular trades into a clearinghouse stabilizes AIG. AIG 
might not have been able to fully collect $1 billion from BoA outside of the 
clearinghouse. But the clearinghouse nets its obligation to BoA against the obligation 
from BoA, collects $1 billion from Bear Stearns, and then has an unencumbered $1 
billion to pay to AIG. 
 
Moreover, a speedy setoff transpires. Despite BoA’s failure, AIG is paid 
quickly and, although teetering, is not pushed over into insolvency. It obtains 
its needed $1 billion from the clearinghouse. All is, thus far, good. Figure 7 
illustrates. 
4. How the Clearinghouse Transmits Inside Loss to the Outside  
The realism I add here is simple. Bank of America has not just one 
creditor, AIG. It also owes $1 billion to Citibank outside the clearinghouse. The 
original contract with AIG was a derivatives contract, which clears. The 
contract with Citibank is another kind that does not. (The source of BoA’s 
obligation to Citibank is not vital to the analytics. It could come from custom-
made trades such as uncleared derivatives obligations, discussed below in Part 
V, but it could also be a simple obligation from a loan syndicate, a guarantee, 
or a sale from one bank to the other of a subsidiary.) Figure 8 illustrates. 
Posit that Bank of America originally had a clearable derivatives deal with 
Bear Stearns, one that turned against Bear, with Bear owing the clearinghouse, 
and the clearinghouse owing BoA, $1 billion. Without a clearinghouse, BoA 
would have had a $1 billion asset (the $1 billion that Bear owes it) and would 
owe $2 billion, half to AIG and half to Citibank. Having only $1 billion, BoA 
would pay AIG and Citibank each $500 million and each would suffer a $500 
million loss. The clearinghouse stabilizes AIG in Figure 8, as it did in Figure 7. 
The $1 billion the clearinghouse owes to BoA never leaves the clearinghouse to 
become an asset of BoA, Citibank cannot touch that value. Due to the 
clearinghouse’s enhanced capacity for setoff, an insolvent BoA fails to fully 
pay Citibank. The clearinghouse stabilizes AIG, just as regulators hope it will, 
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but it does so at the expense of destabilizing Citibank. Systemic risk is not 
lowered; it is transferred. 
 
FIGURE 8: The clearinghouse stabilizes AIG, but destabilizes Citibank 
The clearinghouse stabilizes AIG, as in Figure 7. But because the $1 billion the 
clearinghouse owes to Bank of America never leaves the clearinghouse and instead is 
paid out of posted capital or setoff, Citibank cannot touch that value. An insolvent BoA 
fails to fully pay Citibank. The clearinghouse stabilizes AIG, at the expense of 
destabilizing Citibank. Systemic risk is not lowered; it is transferred. 
 
This clearinghouse scenario in Figure 8 resembles the setoff in Figure 4. 
The straightforward illustrations here resemble those common in explanations 
championing clearinghouses. Typical explanations show a web of 
interconnected trading, which the clearinghouse greatly simplifies.
84  The 
explanations soundly illustrate clearinghouses simplifying a transactional 
tangle and speeding up settlement. But simplifying a tangle does not by itself 
eliminate systemic risk if the tangled traders have systemically vital outside 
obligations that the simplification deters them from performing. The 
clearinghouse protects AIG, eliminating counterparty risk by transferring it to 
Citibank, which instead of losing $500 million, ends up losing the full $1 
 
84.  See, for example, NORMAN, supra note 40, at 9, who illustrates the untangling of multiple 
bilateral derivatives deals on the left, by interposing the clearinghouse (“CCP”) sitting between every 
party, on the right: 
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billion.
85 Regulators would need to know that the institutions and markets that 
are made to bear the risk are systemically less important than the clearinghouse 
members. But not only has this not been shown, it has not even been part of the 
regulatory inquiry and it may well not be true. The outsiders’  systemic 
unimportance is not self-evident, as we see below. Regulators have been 
overconfident about clearinghouses’  capacity to reduce systemic risk  by 
reducing counterparty risk, because they have not examined the risk transfer 
mechanics. The loss is not avoided; it is transferred. 
The clearinghouse here has not reduced systemic risk from the loss, just as 
classic bankruptcy setoff analysis shows that setoff does not primarily reduce, 
but only transfers, the loss. The clearinghouse transferred BoA’s default risk 
from AIG to Citibank, but did not eliminate that risk from the system. If 
Citibank and AIG are equally systemically important, the clearinghouse has 
done AIG good, but has not improved the systemic outcome. If Citibank is 
more systemically important than AIG, then the clearinghouse would increase 
systemic risk by weakening a tottering Citibank. One domino still stands, but 
another domino now falls. 
Overall here, on the contagion conduit for systemic risk, the clearinghouse 
cannot be said to have ex ante reduced or increased systemic risk. This is a 
serious debility because Dodd-Frank’s regulatory raison d’être is to reduce 
systemic risk by reducing contagion from counterparty failure. And, when we 
return below to information contagion and asset price panics, we see 
clearinghouses will be helpless forts on a plain, with the systemic action 
damaging the system elsewhere. 
D. The Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Propositions 
One of finance theory’s central insights helps us see the indeterminacy of 
clearinghouses in reducing systemic risks. 
The fundamental risk that a clearinghouse lifts from its members’ 
shoulders persists. Much of it is transferred to others outside the clearinghouse. 
Hence, the view that clearinghouses reduce systemic risk must be qualified and, 
possibly,  rejected. One can think of this as analogous to a law of energy 
conservation—risk is not directly reduced by this kind of financial 
manipulation, but only shifted from one shoulder to another. For such insights 
and development, Franco Modigliani and Merton  Miller won their Nobel 
Prizes. 
Modigliani-Miller (“M-M”) irrelevance and clearinghouse overconfidence 
are conceptually parallel: Prior to the M-M irrelevance propositions, 
 
85. This overall point has not gone unnoticed, although it remains unheeded. Pirrong, supra 
note  62. The clearinghouse might settle the transactions faster than if they transpired off of the 
clearinghouse. Such a reduction in counterparty risk—reducing waiting time—could reduce systemic 
risk in a crisis. I consider this possibility in Part IV.C, where I also consider its opposite—that the 
clearinghouse could slow down transaction settlement.  03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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widespread thinking in academic and practice-based finance circles had it that 
an optimal debt level in a corporation’s financial structure reduced the cost of 
capital because debt reduced risk for investors. Corporate debt was safe and 
cheap, and in the pre-M-M thinking, its safety and lower cost were gains for the 
firm. Because creditors took on less risk of the firm’s failure, creditors charged 
the firm less and stockholders profited. 
Modigliani and Miller showed that the conventional risk-reduction 
wisdom could not be true. The riskiness of corporate debt and equity emanates 
from the riskiness of the firm’s operations. Modulating the level of debt 
reallocates risk between debt and equity, but it does not eliminate a business’s 
underlying risk. As long as markets are sufficiently efficient and outsiders 
understand a firm’s operations and expected cash flows, the firm’s debt policy 
is irrelevant to its operational riskiness and its overall value.
86 
Later work showed how capital market inefficiencies could allow capital 
structure choices to create (or destroy) firm value: Information inside and 
outside the firm is not identical, and debt can mitigate informational 
inefficiencies better than equity.
87 The firm’s managers may work harder and 
smarter, if more debt makes insolvency and managerial turnover more likely. 
Debt has been taxed less than equity. But too much debt leads to costly 
bankruptcies, restructurings, and lost investment opportunities. Each of these 
exceptions to M-M’s theoretical structure can make the firm with the right level 
of debt more valuable. But those market frictions have not reversed M-M’s 
core insight that, in the first instance, adjusting the capital structure does not 
directly change the overall level of the firm’s operational risk or the firm’s 
overall value. One needs further analysis, and that analysis must uncover 
market friction, if one wants to show that a capital structure choice changes the 
firm’s total value and its operational risk. 
The clearinghouse-setoff analysis is parallel. The clearinghouse does not 
in itself reduce systemic risk emanating from a failing Bank of America, even if 
it stops that contagion risk from spreading to a systemically vital AIG. Rather, 
the clearinghouse transfers the loss to BoA’s other creditors, without changing 
the financial system’s overall soundness. If the other creditors are systemically 
unimportant, or financially stronger, or better able to adjust to the risks, then, 
yes, systemic risk is reduced. But the relative strength has not been shown in 
the pro-clearinghouse writing or even been analyzed, and is far from 
foreordained. 
While the abstract M-M framework does not reflect the fullness of 
financial reality, in academic or practical finance analysis it will no longer do to 
baldly assert that debt increases value and, hence, one should increase debt 
 
86. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
87. For syntheses of the post-M-M thinking, see RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 440–67 (10th ed. 2013); IVO WELCH, CORPORATE FINANCE 590 (2d ed. 2013). 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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towards the optimal. One must ascertain whether the debt and its terms could 
induce increased managerial effort, reduce information costs in the market, 
reduce the corporate tax bill, or otherwise increase firm value. If not, the debt is 
of limited value, or even detrimental. Such analytic efforts need to be made for 
clearinghouses.
88  The analytics thus far, which I  extend in sections below, 
demonstrate why the clearinghouses’ major purported benefits do not clear that 
hurdle. 
IV. 
EXTENDING THE RISK TRANSFER PRINCIPLE: CREATING AND DESTROYING 
SYSTEMIC RISK 
The core advantage that clearinghouse proponents put forth is that 
clearinghouses can contain the contagion risk emanating from the failure of a 
major financial institution, preventing the failure from escaping the 
clearinghouse to attack others. Interconnected institutions would arguably be 
protected from risks such as those from the failure of the huge Long-Term 
Capital Management (“LTCM”) in 1998 in which Russian interest rates and 
exchanges rates moved unexpectedly, undermining LTCM’s currency bets.
89 
The systemic fear was that LTCM’s defaults would spread, dragging down the 
many Wall Street firms that LTCM could not pay back.
90 I have shown that for 
the most part a clearinghouse moves that type of counterparty contagion risk 
elsewhere, but does not eliminate it. Hence, the wide confidence in 
clearinghouses as bulwarks to contain systemic risk is inappropriate. 
Potential rebuttals to the risk transfer uncertainty analytics should be 
considered. Could the clearinghouse reduce total systemic risk in other ways? 
Next on clearinghouse proponents’ lists is that the clearinghouse mutualizes 
 
88. Such M-M-type thinking has improved our understanding of other bankruptcy issues. 
Thus, secured debt has been understood to transfer risk, not necessarily reduce it, with the transfers 
moving to tort creditors, Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of 
Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3, 7–8, 11 n.28 (1981), or to non-adjusting contract creditors, 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996). 
Similarly, strong priorities for derivatives contracts in bankruptcy have been shown to transfer the 
risk of derivatives’ failures to the bankrupt’s other creditors, not necessarily eliminating the risk of 
these new instruments. Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy 
Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 101 (2005); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives 
Market’s Payments Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011); see 
generally Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319 (2010); 
Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1019, 1036 (2007); Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 253 (2009). 
89. Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, 
13 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 199 (1999). 
90. Id. at 189 (“If the misadventures of a single wayward hedge fund[, Long Term Capital 
Management,] with only about $4.8 billion in equity at the start of 1998 . . . [took] the United 
States . . . close to the precipice of financial disaster . . . what might happen if a number of hedge funds 
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risk, dissipating it among members, turning something life  threatening  into 
several healable wounds. Another possibility is that the clearinghouse’s 
transactional efficiencies become the marginal benefit that saves the 
systemically vital firm. A third rebuttal would concede that the clearinghouse 
transfers risk without eliminating it, but would argue that the clearinghouse 
transfers the risk from systemically vital insiders to systemically unimportant 
outsiders. A fourth is that the clearinghouse will provide speed and certainty to 
its insiders, without degrading the speed and certainty of settlement for the 
outsiders. A fifth is that clearinghouses could restructure derivatives trading so 
that it is less concentrated, with trading occurring outside of the core too-big-
to-fail financial firms. 
While some of these rebuttals are conceptually strong, as far as they go 
(that is, they can provide a real benefit), and none should be fully rejected, each 
needs to be qualified by the risk transfer concept. With the risk transfer concept 
in mind, one sees that each asserted impact will often be reduced by offsetting 
movement of risk and loss, and sometimes rendered directionally uncertain. 
Worse, these additions fail to address  the second fundamental 
clearinghouse limitation, namely that the core systemic problems of the last 
financial crisis grew out of information contagion and an asset sell-off, not 
from the containable failure of a key financial institution. Information 
contagion and an economy-wide asset sell-off are systemic degradations that 
clearinghouses are not designed to reverse, which they may readily exacerbate, 
and which the rebuttals do not handle. I address these rebuttals and their limits 
in this Part IV. 
A. Clearinghouse Mutualization Mechanics:  
Dissipating or Gathering Systemic Risk? 
A clearinghouse mutualizes risk among the clearinghouse’s members, 
spreading it so that they all insure one another’s obligations. Several financial 
institutions put up capital on which the clearinghouse can call. A systemically 
important institution that fails is thereby insured by the other members, 
stopping the systemic problem before it gets out of hand. But the risk transfer 
uncertainty principle I have pushed forward demonstrates that the 
mutualization benefit is offset by an equal and opposite cost, because 
mutualization also gathers disparate risks, focusing them in a way that can 
make a financial entity that was hardly vulnerable before into one that is 
seriously vulnerable after. 
That is, the clearinghouse can dissipate risk, yes, but its structure can just 
as well funnel multiple separate risks onto a systemically dangerous focal point. 
A clearinghouse can thereby create systemic danger that otherwise would have 
dissipated naturally. Ex ante, there’s little reason for regulators to think that 
clearinghouse mutualization improves our overall systemic risk profile. In this 
Section, we see why. 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
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1. MF Global Risk  
The failure of a systemically unimportant but big clearinghouse member 
could put the systemically important clearinghouse at risk. If an outsider fell 
when standing alone, its failure would be local, not systemic. But if it trades via 
a clearinghouse, then, during a period of financial and economic uncertainty, all 
clearinghouse trading might freeze up for fear that the clearinghouse could fail. 
The 2011 failure of the not-small MF Global, with $40 billion in assets, 
was a local failure.
91  It lost on massive (and potentially clearable) bets on 
European sovereign debt, and it misplaced more than $1 billion in customer 
money.
92  Consider the impact of MF Global’s failure if it had cleared its 
transactions on one of the new clearinghouses. Its failure  alone was not 
systemically dangerous, but if it could not have made good on major 
obligations to a clearinghouse, the clearinghouse would then be at risk. If the 
clearinghouse was itself too  big  to  fail, then the clearinghouse would have 
manufactured systemic risk that was not otherwise present. 
A clearinghouse may move serious but containable risk from big but 
isolated, not-too-big-to-fail financial institutions into the clearinghouse itself, 
worsening systemic risk. If the clearinghouse must then be rescued,
93  or if 
uncertainty about the clearinghouse’s solvency led trading in the 
clearinghouse’s products to cease, then the clearinghouse would have gathered 
in risks from an outside innocuous environment into a systemically dangerous 
one.
94 Funneling otherwise distinct, separated risks into a vital institution is the 
systemically dangerous reverse of mutualizing a single large risk via the 
clearinghouse. It’s unclear ex ante which effect is potentially bigger or more 
likely. Regulators are focused on the benefit, not the equally plausible cost. 
2. Aggregations of Smaller Traders  
Regulators will insist on opening the clearinghouse to a wide range of 
financial participants, including smaller ones. If a few midsized traders fail 
simultaneously and cannot make good on their obligations to the clearinghouse, 
the systemically important clearinghouse could be put at risk. The 
clearinghouse would again have created and funneled, but not dissipated, 
systemic risk. 
 
91. MF GLOBAL HOLDINGS LTD., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 84 (Mar. 31, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1401106/000119312511145663/d10k.htm# 
tx172225_27. 
92. Nick Brown, MF Global Trustee Sees $1.6 Billion Claims Gap, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/10/us-mf-global-trustee-gap-idUSTRE8191QF20120210. 
93. See Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why 
Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 
(2011) (criticizing Dodd-Frank’s limitation on Fed loans to clearinghouses). 
94. Jeremy C. Stein, Securitization, Shadow Banking and Financial Fragility, DAEDALUS, Fall 
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Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chair, showed how financial 
aggregation via clearinghouses would concentrate the destructive power of 
small trades into a single institution: 
While normally the default risks insured by the clearinghouse are 
idiosyncratic [risks of individual] traders, systemic risks are also 
present . . . .  [A] large price move in the futures market, which, 
particularly if it were coupled with severe declines in asset valuations 
in the rest of the economy, might lead to a large number of 
defaults. . . .  Then there seems to be a potential structural problem 
with the clearinghouse arrangement. . . .  [T]he poor functioning or 
shutdown of the futures market might exacerbate the adverse 
conditions that precipitated the problem in the first place.
95 
Bernanke concluded that clearinghouses must exclude  systemic shocks 
from their insurance function, because clearinghouses could not withstand such 
systemic  shocks, just as some insurance markets exclude economy-wide 
damage from war, hurricanes, or similar shocks that cannot be well 
diversified.
96 Yet, it’s exactly the function that Bernanke excluded back then in 
his post-1987 crash analysis—systemic risk absorption—which the regulatory 
world now seeks to make clearinghouses’ primary role. 
3. Correlated Failure 
Correlated financial failure is closely connected. Mutualization 
presupposes that while one financial firm might go down, the others would be 
stable enough to absorb and spread that one firm’s loss without further 
damaging the economy. But in a systemic crisis, the causes of one firm’s 
failure can simultaneously bring down other firms, whose aggregate failure can 
in turn collapse the interconnected system. 
Regulators have extolled mutualization’s potential for dissipating risk as a 
core benefit of the clearinghouse, but they have been focusing on 
clearinghouse’s potential to handle an isolated failure (or handful of failures), 
while not paying enough attention to the conceptual problem of correlated 
failures. The 2008–2009 crisis was nasty not because an isolated firm failed, for 
which mutualization might have been useful, but because so many of the 
country’s major financial firms held poor quality mortgage-related assets and 
these firms were interconnected, such that the risks each faced paralyzed the 
financial system. 
The clearinghouse is not well  constructed to handle this problem of 
simultaneous setbacks in multiple interconnected financial firms. Indeed, the 
clearinghouse itself could be the situs for the kinds of systemic 
interconnections that were central to the 2008–2009 financial crisis that 
 
95. Bernanke, supra note 5, at 143–44 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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paralyzed the financial system. With the clearinghouses, a few firms could fail, 
and their connection to the clearinghouse could threaten one another, threaten 
the clearinghouse itself (more on that below), and threaten otherwise unaffected 
firms that the clearinghouse is connected to. Clearinghouses can make this 
interconnectedness and simultaneous failure problem harder, not easier, 
because they institutionalize interconnectedness of the country’s major 
financial institutions. 
Consider an analogy to the limits of clearinghouse mutualization: During 
the lead-up to the 2008–2009 crisis, the marketplace aggregated the risks of 
multiple securitizations of mortgages and sold upper layers (purportedly low 
risk) and lower layers (more risk, but diversified). These securities were 
marketed and purchased as risk-reducing packages, without much thought that 
if one of the securitizations failed, the failure could readily be due to 
widespread deterioration of the American mortgage market. Aggregating the 
securities (which was fundamentally  a  mutualization) was designed to 
diversify, but because the core risks were correlated, the aggregations 
concentrated risk without dissipating it. The clearinghouse would do much the 
same. It would mutualize risk, but mutualizing a widespread problem afflicting 
many core financial firms will not reduce systemic risk. Clearinghouses would 
have failed to handle this aspect—a central one—of the 2008–2009 financial 
crisis. 
4. Mutualization as Increasing Transparency or Worsening Opacity? 
Mutualization provides certainty of settlement, according to clearinghouse 
proponents, and that certainty will reduce panic in a crisis. Traders will know 
that counterparty risks are under control because the clearinghouse, backed by 
its capacity to make substantial capital calls on its members, is strong. Trading 
will not freeze up, even in a tough economic climate. 
This is true, as far as it goes. But posit that one of our five major 
derivatives trading institutions is tottering because of investment losses. The 
pro-clearinghouse thinking is that the clearinghouse cabins the risk of panic, 
because counterparties to the tottering institution know that the clearinghouse 
will make good on the transactions even if the weakened institution does not. 
They accordingly continue trading with the tottering member and transfer their 
trades to the strong clearinghouse. 
But uncertainty about a prime member can induce panic elsewhere: If 
traders fear that the prime  member will not be able to meet a capital call 
(because it is tottering), then that will call into question both the clearinghouse 
and the solvency of the other  clearinghouse members upon which the 
clearinghouse will make capital calls. Worse, if the tottering member must sell 
assets to raise cash, then those sales will press downward the value of similar 
assets held by other clearinghouse members. If that pressure results in a sharp 
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then the wide decline will call into question members’  capacity to meet a 
clearinghouse capital call and, hence, their own solvency. Trading may freeze 
up because trading flow depends on members’ capital availability for support. 
Worse yet, because clearinghouses are traditionally  constructed around 
single products (one for foreign exchange, another for interest rates, another for 
commodities), asset price deterioration induced by one tottering member can 
induce clearinghouse-wide asset price deterioration, triggering further collateral 
calls from the clearinghouse itself, and thereby exacerbating the same ugly 
financial spiral that the economy suffered from in the financial crisis. The 
clearinghouse’s strength in standing behind the cleared trades may then be 
subject to marketplace doubts because its strength depends on its members’ 
solvency. But its members, to whom the clearinghouse would turn to for 
support, are the weakened primary derivatives dealers themselves. If one or two 
appear to be insolvent and unable to meet capital or collateral calls, then 
mutualizing risk via the clearinghouse will degrade the entire clearinghouse, 
cast an ominous shadow over the financial market it’s meant to steady, and risk 
calling into question the solvency of the other clearinghouse members.
97 
5. Increased Internal Trading, More Externalized Risk  
An efficient clearinghouse, especially one with implicit too-big-to-fail 
government backing, will increase trading volume. Although the trades may be 
sound when done one by one, they may become systemically risky when 
voluminous
98 by expanding critical financial institutions’ risky trading. To the 
extent that systemic risk is in the size  of the overall market for financial 
derivatives, then the clearinghouse impact in expanding the market is not 
wholly systemically good.
99 
*  *  * 
In sum, mutualization aggregates, but does so both protectively and 
destructively. If the clearinghouse dissipates the costs of a member’s failure by 
aggregating more support for the failing trader, it protects and reduces systemic 
risk; but when it aggregates discrete risks, as it must through its central 
 
97. Cf. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 10 (2d ed. 2009); 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387, 402 (2000) (arguing that those trading with a partnership must know the net worth of each partner 
to assess the partnership well). 
98. Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asymmetric 
Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty 25–30 (University of 
Houston,  Department of Finance, Working Paper, 2009),  available at  www.ssrn.com/abstract= 
1340660. 
99. If these local efficiencies in trading, transparency, and speedy netting provide enough 
efficiency gains that a marginal but systemically dangerous institution survives instead of fails, then 
the clearinghouse efficiencies are marginally systemically beneficial. The systemic risk argument is 
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operation, it can destructively create systemic risk where there had been 
none.
100 
B. Clearinghouse Internal Mechanics: Can They Alone Contain Systemic Risk? 
Here we consider a key clearinghouse efficiency to see how it can, and 
cannot, be more than marginal, and how it can affect systemic risk. 
Clearinghouses simplify the circular problem, which is illustrated in Figure 1. 
If both (1) the members have no exterior obligations and (2) settling the 
internal obligations quickly is the primary systemic goal, then the 
clearinghouse could reduce systemic vulnerability. 
The common view in derivatives clearing circles is that clearinghouse 
setoff does not pose risk to anyone else.
101 But derivatives-trading financial 
institutions have lives outside of the clearinghouse, and those outside financial 
lives and interconnections are what’s systemically important. The outside lives 
involve the country’s business and consumer loan base, its bank deposits, and 
its financial flows. The vulnerability of these derivatives-trading institutions’ 
other interconnections with the real economy and with other financial players 
are what make unstable derivatives trading potentially systemically dangerous. 
The clearinghouse does not isolate the systemically important firm from the 
rest of the real economy, but moves its risks of failure from one spot to another. 
So, first off, the circular problem that a clearinghouse solves is not in 
isolation a systemic problem. The failure of a group of derivatives traders that 
are not strongly connected either to major parts of the real economy or to other 
critical financial markets is regrettable, but not systemically dangerous. MF 
Global’s post-crisis failure partly illustrates this. It traded derivatives, but its 
failure was not systemically costly. If a clearinghouse made its failure less 
costly, that would be good, but it would not be systemically beneficial. Netting 
inside the clearinghouse compresses the traders’ cross-obligations and settles 
them quickly, but these obligations are systemically important only if the 
clearinghouse’s members have important obligations outside of the 
clearinghouse. And if they have vital outside obligations, then clearinghouse 
compression transfers risk from inside to outside, which does not in itself lower 
overall systemic risk. It’s not easy to have it both ways—that the financial 
 
100. Clearinghouses will be regulated efficaciously and superior regulation will contain 
systemic risk, proponents argue. But regulation of the banking system has been persistently inadequate 
(because it is complex, captured by the regulated, or suffers from regulatory error). Regulation of 
clearinghouses will also be complex, subject to industry capture, and susceptible to regulatory error. It 
is not a cure for the persistent difficulties of financial regulation, just another site for their 
manifestation. Over time, regulators will not be able to perform as well as ardent clearinghouse 
backers hope; for example, major financial players will have incentives to saddle the clearinghouse 
with low-probability balloon risks, which the government will feel compelled to absorb in a future 
major financial storm. 
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institution’s failure is systemically dangerous but the institution itself is 
sufficiently isolated that its failure can be contained inside the clearinghouse. 
The core American derivatives-trading financial institutions are Bank of 
America, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley.
102 
They have large, deep, recurrent, and systemically critical interconnections 
with one another and  with the rest of the economy that are outside the 
clearinghouse,  such as uncleared (and unclearable) derivatives transactions, 
widespread old-school lending syndicates, interbank debt,
103  deep and wide 
bank commercial paper markets, and the massive new-finance repo market. 
(Below, I illustrate via Figure 9 and analyze in detail one vital connection—that 
with money market funds.) If these other interconnections are fail-safe, fine. If 
they are not, we have overinvested in clearinghouses, to the detriment of 
handling these other interconnections. 
This problem with pro-clearinghouse logic becomes evident by examining 
its syllogism: (1) the core five financial firms dealing in derivatives are 
systematically important because they are deeply interconnected with the rest 
of the financial system, (2) when one fails, they tear the fabric of the rest of the 
financial system, (3) we can save one from failing via a clearinghouse by 
shifting losses from the country’s largest financial institutions to outsiders, (4) 
but this loss shift will not be systematically harmful because the tottering 
member is sufficiently isolated from systemically vital connections with the 
rest of the system—it can be saved with the losses harmlessly dissipated 
throughout the financial system. 
Propositions (1) and (4) are difficult to reconcile. If the firm’s 
interconnections are innocuous in (4), then they ought to be innocuous in (1). 
Why save the institution because of its systemically vital interconnections in 
proposition (1) but then believe that it’s easy to dissipate the losses out from 
that firm to systemically innocuous interconnections in proposition (4)? 
C. Clearinghouse External Risk Transfers: Dissipating Systemic Risk? 
A related rebuttal to clearinghouse overconfidence could be advanced: if 
we dissipated the concentrated risk of a vital financial institution’s failure into 
small pieces throughout the economy, then the clearinghouse could  reduce 
systemic risk. For example, if derivatives-trading institutions were primarily 
financed by bondholders, and not bank deposits and the systemically sensitive 
money market, the bondholders could absorb the transferred risk. 
But the institutions are not so financed. The country’s five major 
derivatives players are deeply embedded in the economy. Their trading risk 
 
102. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON 
BANK  TRADING AND DERIVATIVES  ACTIVITIES  FIRST  QUARTER  2012,  at 26 tbl.2,  available at 
http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq112.pdf. 
103. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 25, at 54, 85 (comments of Robert Reoch) (“[A]fter 
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lands not in the hands of just their diversified bondholders but in the hands of 
the United States, as insurer of bank deposits, and in the systemically sensitive 
money market. 
To see just one of those vital interconnections, consider the mutual 
dependence of banks and the money market funds. Much short-term funding 
flowing from savers to users moves first through money market funds, in which 
consumers and businesses place funds to which they want immediate access. 
The money market fund then moves much of that cash into large financial 
institutions, including institutions central to the transactions that regulators 
want cleared. The cash moves from money market funds into major financial 
institutions via short-term commercial paper and repurchase agreements. For 
the first, the core institutions issue short-term I.O.U.’s to the money market. 
For the second, they sell their portfolio securities to the money market, 
promising to buy them back at a higher price, usually the next day. Banks’ 
“marginal source of funding has [become] the capital markets, for example 
through repurchase agreement or commercial paper.”
104 “[S]ecured repo credit 
constitute[s] . . . 60% of federally insured deposits. . . . [It is not] a perfectly 
secure and certain way to borrow . . . .  When things become volatile, repos 
have counter-party risk attached to them and they can disappear [from banks’ 
balance sheets] as rapidly as demand deposits.”
105 Figure 9 illustrates. 
 
FIGURE 9: The clearinghouse stabilizes the cleared entities,  
but destabilizes the money market 
 
Thus, the huge repo market, the bank-based commercial paper system, 
and the tremendous money market connect to the core financial institutions’ 
clearable trading. Counterparty risk that a clearinghouse  lifts from its  core 
institutions’ shoulders is set down elsewhere, and that elsewhere can be another 
systemically crucial part of the economy. It can move into the money market, 
 
104. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 25, at 18.  
105. Id. at 80 (comments of Richard Herring, University of Pennsylvania). The quoted term, 
“repo,” is short for repurchase agreement, a common form of short-term, often overnight funding in 
the finance industry. 
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including into fragile money market funds, as the insolvent AIG, Bear, or 
Lehman of the next crisis pays up on its cleared instruments and consequently 
finds itself with less cash and less capital to repay others. Readers who closely 
followed the unfolding of the last financial crisis will recognize this pattern. 
When Lehman failed due to investment losses, it could not pay off its 
commercial paper debts to a very large, venerable money market fund,  the 
Reserve Primary Fund. The fund then also failed, heightening the panic and the 
financial crisis: 
After Lehman [went] bankrupt[] . . . its outstanding debt collapsed in 
price almost immediately. Since one of the largest money market 
mutual funds (MMMFs), the Reserve Primary Fund, was highly 
exposed to Lehman Brothers’ collapsing short-term debt, its net asset 
value (NAV) fell below par the next day. Since MMMFs offer stable 
NAV and investors can redeem anytime at par, an immediate run on 
the Reserve Primary Fund occurred, causing it to shut down. This 
failure opened up the possibility that other MMMFs were similarly 
exposed, and a run on the MMMFs started. Since MMMFs are a 
primary source for the commercial paper market, this run opened up 
the possibility of capital shortfalls at many financial institutions that 
needed to roll over commercial paper. Only after the government 
guaranteed the MMMF deposits 100% did the run come to a halt and 
the slide stopped.
106 
The Reserve Primary Fund’s failure induced a “broader liquidity crisis . . . 
as [money market fund] managers, facing enormous redemptions, curtailed 
their lending[.]”
107  One-third of a trillion dollars left money market funds 
within a week, forcing the government to guarantee repayment of all money 
market funds.
108 
I emphasize here that the Reserve-Lehman analysis does not tell us that 
clearinghouses would have raised  systemic risk, but tells us that the 
clearinghouse could readily move systemic risk from one systemically 
dangerous place to another. Because interconnectedness problems  are 
widespread, one should expect that this kind of movement of systemic risk 
without reduction to it would be likely. Hence, the economy would in such a 
systemic event not be better off. Other remedies must be found. 
 
106. Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Öncü,  A Proposal for the Resolution of Systemically 
Important Assets and Liabilities: The Case of the Repo Market, INT’L J. CENT. BANKING, Jan. 2013, at 
293, 294; accord TOBIAS ADRIAN & ADAM B. ASHCRAFT, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REP. NO. 
559,  SHADOW  BANKING:  A  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE,  22, 27 (2012), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr580.pdf.  
107. Patrick E. McCabe, The Cross Section of Money Market Fund Risks and the Financial 
Crises 1 (Fed. Res. Bd., Fin. & Econ. Disc. Series No. 2010-51, 2010). 
108. PRESIDENT’S  WORKING  GROUP ON FINANCIAL  MARKETS,  MONEY  MARKET  FUND 
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At year-end 2010, the United States had $1.6 trillion in such bank-
interconnected money market funds.
109 Half of the assets of the largest money 
market funds are exposed to the banking system via uninsured bank deposits, 
uninsured repurchase agreements with banks, and uninsured bank-issued 
commercial paper.
110 This is just one systemically vital financing channel from 
the country’s major derivatives-trading institutions. Other systemically vital 
institutions are also exposed to these derivatives-trading firms, such as hedge 
funds (which are owed substantial sums from the derivatives-trading banks via 
overnight repurchase agreements) and the banks themselves (which have 
obligations to one another outside of any clearable trades).
111 
D. Can the Clearinghouse Reduce Panic? 
Clearinghouse proponents could reply: even if the clearinghouses 
primarily change only the locus of loss, as long as the new locus is less likely to 
induce financial panic, systemic risk has been reduced. Posit that Bank of 
America is at risk, because of Bear’s incipient failure. If the market is uncertain 
as to (1) how exposed Bank of America is to Bear, and (2) how insolvent Bank 
of America really is, then panic could and would set in, crashing the financial 
system first and the real economy next. 
But this panic argument faces the same risk transfer difficulty as the risk 
reduction argument. Moving the loss may indeed reduce the chance of panic. 
Or moving it to a new locus may set off the same panic. Or moving the risk 
may turn a containable situation into one that induces panic. Regulators expect 
that the clearinghouse will only produce the first scenario, but there’s no reason 
ex ante to be confident that the second and third scenarios are not as, or even 
more, likely. To use the setup from the prior section, the clearinghouse may 
save firms exposed to a failing Lehman’s derivatives book in 2015, but then 
Lehman is even more likely to default on paying the Reserve Fund, since the 
clearinghouse would sop up more of Lehman’s assets. The Reserve Fund’s 
failure would then set off panic. 
 
109. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2011 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 164, 171 
(2011). 
110. This Article’s unpublished appendix, which is on file with the author,  shows the 
calculations, derived from the money market funds’ SEC filings on Form N-MFP. The appendix also 
shows a sampling of funds beyond the largest, whose exposure to the banking system was even greater 
than that of the largest funds, with multiple funds having a banking exposure exceeding 80 percent of 
their total value. 
111. Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin, two Federal Reserve economists, describe the large 
and growing interbank dependencies arising from non-derivative-based, non-clearable securitization. 
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E. Further Clearinghouse Benefits: Speed and Liquidity? 
The clearinghouse has consequences that can reduce systemic risk, if the 
financial breaks occur in the right places. In this Section and in Section G, we 
examine two of these—enhancing liquidity and restructuring market 
concentration.  In principle, the clearinghouse can  increase internal  liquidity 
without  degrading external illiquidity  as much. This is potentially real and 
valuable. Potentially even more important is that clearinghouses could shake up 
the current highly concentrated structure of derivatives trading and could 
decentralize  it,  so that the systemically important financial institutions lost 
much of the cleared derivatives trading business. Such trading shifts and 
decentralization could well reduce systemic risk. 
Liquidity first. The clearinghouse settlement circle provides liquidity to its 
members by settling complex trades more quickly than they can be settled 
outside of the clearinghouse. Not every dime of liquidity risk that the 
clearinghouse saves its members is transferred to outsiders. The clearinghouse 
could provide liquidity in a crisis, by quickly compressing that round-robin of 
obligations quickly. It thus would provide a benefit without a fully offsetting 
outside cost. The clearinghouse member that survives another day, because of 
the quicker settlement of internal transactions, could even make good on more 
outside obligations.
112 
This liquidity benefit, however, partly suffers from the risk transfer 
uncertainty analytic. Regulators are focused on members posting adequate 
liquid collateral. But as we have already seen, collateral adequacy, even if 
achieved, is strongly subject to the risk transfer principle, because the collateral 
that the clearinghouse obtains is value no longer available to the clearinghouse 
members’  outside creditors. Second, the clearinghouse can undermine this 
liquidity as well as enhance it, as in the other risk transfer scenarios. Third, the 
liquidity benefit does not address the core systemic risks of the 2008–2009 
financial crisis, namely, information contagion and asset price collateral 
selloffs. More detail on each of the three follows. 
First, consider risk transfer uncertainty. Some fraction of the liquidity gain 
inside the clearinghouse comes at the cost of losing liquidity outside: the 
member posts cash or liquid securities (such as U.S. Treasury obligations) as 
collateral to the clearinghouse. If the member becomes insolvent, the 
clearinghouse liquidates the pledged security to pay another member who 
profited on the underlying trade. But the internal liquidity is offset by the risk 
transfer principle, because the failed clearinghouse member posted those liquid 
securities from its overall portfolio. As a result, the securities are unavailable to 
provide liquidity for its outside obligations. 
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Ex ante reaction from outside parties would further reduce the liquidity 
benefit. Savvy financial players outside the clearinghouse will know that they 
will be hurt if a counterparty totters and has posted its liquid collateral to the 
clearinghouse. Returning to the earlier example, the clearinghouse conceivably 
saves AIG by ensuring that a tottering Bank of America will pay AIG quickly 
and in full, but it transfers the liquidity problem outside, to Citibank. A savvy 
Citi would anticipate that the clearinghouse will get the good, liquid collateral 
and that the clearinghouse will intercept payments that would otherwise have 
gone to Citi. Citi, hence, has incentives to adjust ex ante and demand more 
liquidity protection from AIG, insisting on shorter maturities in its trades, more 
liquid collateral, or other protections. 
But if Citi is naïve and fails to adjust, the risk of financial failure due to a 
liquidity crisis moves from the clearinghouse members’ internal dealings out to 
Citibank. The AIG and Bank of America dominoes stand and the Citi domino 
falls, as we showed above. Winners and losers would vary, but systemic risk 
would not be reduced. 
Second, the setoff speed and liquidity benefit depend on clearinghouses 
being able to set off more of their obligations with the failed firm than could be 
set off without the clearinghouse. The setoff of mutual debts—from and to the 
clearinghouse—can create temporary liquidity, because the clearinghouse need 
not wait for the member’s bankruptcy to finish before  collecting on the 
member’s debt to the clearinghouse; the clearinghouse can set off its own debt 
to the failed member. Because the setoff can usually occur more quickly than 
regular debt collection, more setoff means, yes, that more risk is transferred 
one-for-one to the outsiders, but the insiders can settle out more quickly than 
the outsiders ever could. The relatively speedy setoff is then better than 
ordinary debt collection. Richard Squire has elegantly shown this to be possible 
and potentially important.
113  This  potential for speed is a value of the 
clearinghouse, although not one trumpeted by its regulatory proponents. 
Darrell Duffie and Haoxiang Zhu examine this setoff problem differently. 
In the bilateral derivatives market, dealers trade interest-rate derivatives on one 
day, foreign exchange contracts on another, and credit default swaps on a third. 
All three obligations are aggregated and netted. But when derivatives trades are 
given over to clearinghouses, the obligations are segregated into different 
institutions, based on their type. The foreign exchange derivative typically 
moves to a foreign exchange clearinghouse, the commodities to commodities 
clearinghouses, and the interest rate derivatives to their own clearinghouse. 
Duffie, a leading thinker on derivatives clearinghouses,  shows that the 
clearinghouse-reconfigured risks may lead either to more, to less, or to the 
same level of setoff. This uncertainty is the risk transfer ambiguity playing out 
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once again. Clearinghouses can thereby reduce setoff speed and liquidity in a 
crisis as well as increase them.
114 
Moreover, certainty and speed depend on the setoff obligations being 
largely uncontested. But this is not always so. It is not unknown in financial 
litigation for one party or another to contest the size of, the factual basis for, or 
even the existence of an obligation. Indeed, in the Lehman bankruptcy, much of 
the derivatives book was challenged and litigated; the conflicts took several 
years to resolve.
115 It has taken several years to track down assets in the MF 
Global bankruptcy. Once a litigation contest  starts, much of the liquidity 
advantage disappears. 
The clearinghouse’s potential to enhance liquidity is a type of Modigliani-
Miller issue. In perfect markets, the triangle of claims can be settled or sold. If 
such disputes could be rapidly settled or sold at fair value in the real world, the 
clearinghouse would enhance liquidity.
116 The pro-clearinghouse claim should 
be that clearinghouses (1) reduce settlement costs (2) in an important way that 
is (3) unavailable otherwise. These features are plausibly but not surely 
available and are not the primary goals motivating Dodd-Frank clearinghouse 
construction. Moreover, there is the risk that if key clearinghouse members fail, 
the clearinghouse might stop significant financial movement until the 
clearinghouse itself could be stabilized. In such a scenario, an important sector 
of the system’s liquidity would dry up due to the clearinghouse. 
This leads to the liquidity rebuttal’s third flaw, which is that it is unable to 
address a central problem. Clearinghouses  in general and the liquidity and 
 
114. Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce 
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certainty advantage in particular are attuned to addressing counterparty failure. 
Enhancing counterparty liquidity could help alleviate systemic risk by 
dissipating contagion from a single counterparty’s failure. But the last crisis 
involved more than just one or two counterparty failures. Multiple failures 
afflicted derivatives traders throughout the market. Asset prices declined 
precipitously, as failed trades led to collateral sales, which put pressure on asset 
prices and led to more defaults. And then uncertainty as to who was solvent and 
who was not induced information contagion. These two contagion channels 
were critical in the crisis but clearinghouse liquidity is not designed to address 
them, and can readily exacerbate them in a crisis. We turn in the next Section to 
this drawback, which is severe. 
F. Clearinghouse Systemic Risk Targets 
The clearinghouse as a systemic risk reducer has another major weakness 
which I have alluded to and which I now expand upon. The systemic risks the 
clearinghouse needs to address are those core to the last financial crisis: not just 
counterparty contagion, which we have seen it can only weakly handle in 
systemic terms, but also systemic information opacity and an asset  price 
downward spiral. Even if the clearinghouse could overcome the reservations as 
to counterparty default risk, it is poorly structured to handle asset price 
contagion and information contagion.
117 
Consider each in more detail. For the clearinghouse to provide payment 
certainty for its members, it must make collateral calls when the value of its 
side of a derivatives contract declines. When it calls for more collateral, the 
weak institution that is on the losing end must raise cash, which it often does by 
selling assets. When the failing institution nevertheless defaults, the 
clearinghouse, to provide its members speed and certainty, sells the failed 
member’s posted collateral. When it sells, it exacerbates the asset price 
pressure that was core to the last financial crisis. This result is similar to both 
the M-M parallel for collateral collection and to the setoff risk transfer 
uncertainty, in that the problem is moved but not eliminated. Instead of the 
failing firm’s own counterparties selling collateral, as would happen for 
uncleared derivatives, the clearinghouse sells the collateral backing up cleared 
derivatives. The clearinghouse changes the locus of the sale, but not whether 
the collateral is sold. Nothing systemically important is gained by putting the 
trades and sales inside a clearinghouse so that the clearinghouse, instead of 
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counterparties, liquidates the collateral in a crisis. The collateral is liquidated 
either way, and the pressure on asset prices rises either way. 
Clearinghouse proponents might reply that the collateral posted will be 
safe, secure, and liquid, and it may well be. But clearinghouse members have 
reasons to degrade collateral quality over time, because posting lower quality 
collateral is cheaper for them. And, even if they do not, when the weakened 
member has to post high-quality collateral, it will often have to sell its 
inventory of riskier, but more profitable, lower quality collateral. That sale will 
put pricing pressure on the value of that collateral, market-wide. 
As for information contagion, consider the possibility that asset prices of 
the clearinghouse’s collateral decline. Posit that only three of the eight 
institutions that are central to the clearinghouse are at immediate risk. But 
because the asset price decline brings into question the clearinghouse’s 
solvency, the clearinghouse will make calls on all members. The solvent 
members could post collateral for their own trades, perhaps, but posit that they 
are unable to cover the failed trades of the three insolvent members, because all 
firms are weakened by simultaneous setbacks, although only three are failing. 
Until the situation clears up, financiers could be unwilling to deal with the truly 
solvent members because of information opacity, as the outsiders do not know 
the extent to which the three insolvencies could, through mutualization, bring 
the solvent members down. Three firms have performance problems, and the 
clearinghouse casts market-wide shadows of performance doubt over all eight 
members. Here, the clearinghouse could, when seeking to provide certainty and 
speed for one part of the market, increase uncertainty and slow down settlement 
speed in other parts. 
Clearinghouse supporters believe  that the clearinghouse will yield big 
informational efficiencies. During the financial crisis, interconnected financial 
institutions became opaque and potential counterparties stayed away. The 
opacity arose from, for example, Citibank’s strength being unclear because a 
potential counterparty could not assess Citibank’s exposure to, say, losses in its 
dealings with a weakened AIG or Lehman, or whether another Citi 
counterparty could weaken Citi because that counterparty was exposed to AIG 
or Lehman. The clearinghouse makes this all transparent, optimists think.
118 
But, a financial player dealing with a clearinghouse member during a financial 
crisis “needs information about the portfolio composition of all other clearing 
members as well as [the member’s] posted collateral levels. This information is 
typically confidential.”
119 Hence, “[t]he member’s . . . risk can increase even if 
[its] portfolio does not change. This is because each member has provided 
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insurance on the . . .  losses of all other clearing members.”
120  One clearing 
member’s insolvency affects the solvency and liquidity of every other member, 
obscuring the very transparency that its proponents seek. Outside liquidity for 
its members would readily be threatened. Mutualization can, as the risk transfer 
principle implies, readily degrade transparency. 
G. Further Benefits: Financial Market Restructuring? 
Recall that America’s largest, most systemically important financial 
institutions are the largest players in the derivatives markets. Dodd-Frank’s 
clearinghouse mandate will standardize the trading of derivatives as much as 
possible because only standardized products can clear well. As we have seen 
repeatedly, this effect largely moves risk around in the financial system, 
without necessarily moving it away from systemically important places. 
But consider this plausible consequential impact. Standardization could 
make it easier for noncore firms to trade derivatives, as it erodes the core firms’ 
informational advantages. (When the products are opaque and the pricing not 
public, firms that do most of the trading know market information that others 
lack and, hence, they can price their trades more astutely.) Standardization and 
transparency, however, induce dealer margins to narrow and should shift the 
competitive arena further toward efficiency and execution, away from access to 
systemically opaque proprietary information. 
Market restructuring could ensue. More of the derivatives business would, 
in this optimistic scenario, shift to firms currently peripheral to the derivatives 
market. With the core financial firms less dependent on derivatives trading, it’s 
plausible that systemic risk outside of the clearinghouse would decrease. 
The difficulty for this scenario is not that it’s impossible or even that it’s 
unlikely. It’s true that standardization could support further concentration in 
financial supermarkets (cheap execution may demand scale economies), or it 
could facilitate market de-concentration and a more competitive structure. With 
the market today highly concentrated, the direction of change from a shake-up 
due to clearinghouses seems more likely toward less concentration—as it 
cannot concentrate much further. But if less concentration is the goal, 
regulators have thus far failed to articulate a policy of using clearinghouses to 
pursue the latter, and they ought to, in order to avoid having the incumbent 
dealers solidify their influence over the clearinghouse.
121 And building largely 
centralized clearinghouses in the hope that (but not the certainty that) the 
industry will de-concentrate seems a peculiar policy in its indirectness, 
although perhaps regulators have concluded that they cannot otherwise induce 
market restructuring and de-concentration. 
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H. A Reservation About Creditor Self-Interest 
For completeness, I lastly note the disjunction here of private incentives 
and public welfare. 
Financial institutions guard against their own failure, but that alertness 
does not arrest the systemic problems. So, in the above scenarios, the weakened 
financial institution has strong incentives to avoid failure. Critics could argue 
that the systemic risk problem is minimized here by creditor self-interest. But 
when guarding against their own failure, creditors do not account for the costs 
that their failure will inflict on the rest of the economy. 
Consider a simple example: Citibank trades $100 million in derivatives 
with AIG. Citibank guards against a failure of AIG to pay Citibank, by 
charging a premium to AIG for Citi’s perception that AIG could fail, by 
monitoring AIG’s financial status, and by insisting on more collateral. But if a 
$100 million loss to Citi has a 1 percent chance of bringing it down and thereby 
cause a consequential, massive, $1 trillion systemic loss to the American and 
world economies, then Citi’s self-interest could lead it to ignore those third-
party knock-on effects, because they are not directly Citi’s problem, but are the 
system’s problem. Citi makes AIG pay for the potential of a $100 million loss 
to Citi, not for the $1 trillion loss to the economy. These third-party effects are 
a major justification for financial regulation.
122 
 
V. 
CLEARINGHOUSES’ OTHER DEBILITIES, DEEPENED BY RISK TRANSFER 
I focused in Part III on systematizing the limits to clearinghouses’ 
capacity to reduce systemic risk, by developing a risk transfer principle 
derivable from the M-M propositions to clearinghouses. Clearinghouses reduce 
risk in one sector or one firm, but then usually silently and relentlessly transfer 
systemic risk into other sectors; they can only dissipate that systemic risk in 
well-defined, nuanced, and unlikely circumstances; and they can too often 
create the same risks that they are intended to diminish. I extended this analytic 
in Part IV to show how potential rebuttals suffer at least in part from variants of 
the risk transfer problem. I also demonstrated that, although clearinghouse 
proponents are addressing an important problem, that of counterparty failure, 
the 2008–2009 financial crisis did not arise from the uncontained failure of a 
single firm like LTCM (the 1998 problem), but from system-wide asset price 
deterioration and information opacity. These are not problems that even 
proponents have seen clearinghouses capable of solving. 
In this Part, I outline, extend, and deepen other major considerations in 
analyzing clearinghouses’  efficacy. These include the likelihood that an 
effective clearinghouse will be too big to fail, that it will be unable to handle 
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many systemically risky transactions, and that it will suffer from a potential for 
misaligned monitoring incentives. 
A. Too Big To Fail 
Clearinghouses will themselves be too-big-to-fail institutions, as many 
have recognized.
123 Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve’s chair, recognized in a 
prior career that clearinghouse failure, or even rumor of clearinghouse 
weakness, is itself a source of systemic danger.
124 Proponents of clearinghouses 
cannot conclude that clearinghouses will not be too big to fail, but must surmise 
that they will be less likely to fail than their constituent financial institutions. 
Too-big-to-fail clearinghouses thereby again illustrate the risk transfer 
principle. Regulators reduce the riskiness emanating from a systemically vital 
institution—the systemically  vital counterparty whose performance risk  the 
clearinghouse mutualizes—only to find that its riskiness has largely reappeared 
elsewhere.  In this case, the risk is absorbed into the newly constructed 
clearinghouse, which itself becomes too big to fail. 
Proponents justify their confidence in the clearinghouses’ resilience with 
the fact that no modern American financial clearinghouse has failed.
125 The 
primary regulator of derivatives, “CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler[,] invariably 
reminds US audiences that no US clearing house serving the futures markets 
has ever failed . . . .”
126  But this confidence is unjustified: financial 
clearinghouses have failed around the world, and nonfinancial clearinghouses 
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have been mismanaged and failed in the United States.
127 Fortunately, these 
clearinghouses were not systemically important and their failures disrupted 
only a single commodity market, not an entire economy.
128 The derivatives 
clearinghouses that are being built will not be so small; they will be 
systemically vital; and they will clear more instruments of a more complex type 
in more volume than has ever before been attempted. 
Worse, it’s plausible that tottering, deeply at-risk clearinghouses averted 
failure in the United States only because their constituent organizations were 
bailed out. Consider the dangerous near-failure of the too-big-to-fail Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, the CME, during the 1987 market crash. As Ben 
Bernanke said, the massive CME may have survived the 1987 crash only 
because the Federal Reserve flooded the CME’s constituent financial 
institutions with liquidity.
129 Had the Fed not done so, some of these would 
have failed and brought down the clearinghouse, deepening the 1987 financial 
crisis, perhaps catastrophically: 
[During] the 1987 stock market crash, a big counterparty of the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) failed to make a large 
payment . . . , leaving the exchange $400 million short. [CME’s] 
president, . . . plead[ed with its own bank to extend it $400 million in 
credit]. Only three minutes before the exchange was due to open, the 
bank [extended CME the credit it needed to open. CME’s president] 
has said repeatedly that if the Merc had not opened that morning, it 
would not have opened again . . . . [If the CME] had not opened that 
morning, the NYSE would not have either[,  said the head of the 
NYSE], and the NYSE might have never reopened again.
130 
B. Structural Defects 
1. Incompleteness Due to Unclearable Transactions  
Clearinghouses cannot clear unique derivative products or products whose 
market values change rapidly. Clearinghouse managers need to observe market 
prices for the cleared transactions so that they know when to insist that traders 
post more collateral. When clearing foreign exchange, for example, trader A 
agrees with B to deliver euros against B’s promise to deliver a fixed sum of 
dollars, six months hence. If the euro rises in the interim, the clearinghouse 
insists that trader A post more collateral, as the trade is then a losing one for A. 
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But if the trade is exotic, with difficult-to-value underlying parameters, then the 
clearinghouse can mistakenly insist on too little collateral. Such opaque trades 
are inappropriate for clearing. If too many risky trades are custom-made, then 
the clearinghouse cannot do its job even under the conventional rationale. 
Worse, if the risk transfer mechanism we are examining is in play, the 
clearinghouse could end up only transferring the risk from the cleared 
instruments to the uncleared ones. 
Policymakers are now distinguishing cleared from uncleared derivatives 
transactions and are in the process of requiring that noncleared derivatives be 
backed by more capital, more collateral, and higher margins than cleared 
derivatives.
131 “Taxing” systemically risky investment to make investors price 
in the systemic risk is sound policy. But the analysis here tells regulators that 
lowering their guard for cleared products is unwise; if the uncleared product 
demands a systemic “tax,”  the cleared product does as well, because the 
systemic risk is not generally extinguished but, as the risk transfer principle 
indicates, is moved elsewhere in the system. 
* * * 
The architectural difficulty is that many transactions cannot move into the 
clearinghouse, because they have opaque pricing, tailor-made terms that are 
hard for clearinghouse officials to monitor, jump-to-default qualities, or 
because they are not even derivative transactions but reflect other kinds of 
risks. The transactions that can clear are the plain vanilla ones, like interest rate 
and foreign currency swaps, which have verifiable prices for the underlying 
trades. The clearinghouse will clear the easier-to-untangle transactions, while 
the difficult-to-untangle ones stay outside. The risk transfer mechanism will 
then move risk from the easier-to-handle interior transactions to the more 
difficult ones, which, if that market remains large enough and interconnected 
enough, will be systemically dangerous. Such a result may worsen systemic 
risk. 
2. Misaligned Incentives 
Counterparties’ incentives to police the deals that they strike change after 
their trades move to a clearinghouse. Consider the A-D trades in Figures 2, 3, 
and 4. D is incentivized to be alert to A’s obligation to D rising and to insist on 
collateral postings. But when A and D clear their trades, D’s incentive to keep 
the trade with A well-collateralized declines, because it’s the clearinghouse that 
becomes obligated to D, not A. Whether the clearinghouse reduces systemic 
risk in this setting depends largely on whether the clearinghouse employees are 
better than D’s management at understanding the market moves in the relevant 
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trades. The clearinghouse transfers a function; it does not eliminate the 
function. 
An experienced and astute academic and real-world analyst of these 
markets, Professor Craig Pirrong, judges that clearinghouses will not be as 
fleet-footed and financially motivated as profit-incentivized banks to evaluate 
counterparty risk.
132  As Professor Franklin Edwards, also an expert on 
clearinghouses, shows, since the clearinghouse “guarantee[s] all . . . contracts 
[flowing through the clearinghouse] . . . , there would no longer be a market 
incentive for customers  to evaluate the financial integrity of [financial 
institutions] they choose to deal with.”
133  And Sean Griffith shows that 
clearinghouse governance structures, with bank dealers being influential, do not 
generate incentives tightly compatible with public goals, as the dealers would 
tolerate more systemic risk than public authorities should want.
134 
Once again, the clearinghouse suffers from the risk transfer principle—
here, it’s as to monitoring incentives. To improve monitoring capacity, 
regulators move transactions from one part of the economy to another, but there 
is reason to doubt that doing so increases net monitoring incentives as opposed 
to moving around tasks, responsibilities, and incentives. 
C. Setoff Institutions, Without Clearinghouses 
A final consideration: private players repeatedly sought to expand setoff 
mechanisms, with clearinghouses being only one such means to set off. The 
recent post-crisis impetus to build clearinghouses is a culmination, not a 
departure. If clearinghouses did not appear, the major trading financial 
institutions would turn, one suspects, to other mechanisms to set off—and 
thereby to transfer risk to other players. Alternative institutions for setoff and 
consequential risk transfer include new financial contracts, an amended 
Bankruptcy Code, and financial supermarkets. A rebuttal to this Article’s thesis 
then is that the players will get expanded setoff mechanisms, one way or 
another. 
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1. The ISDA Contract and Trade Compression 
The derivatives trade association, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (“ISDA”), for example, assembles a model contract for derivatives 
traders, with setoff central to the contract’s structure. The two contracting 
parties agree to net their trading transactions to come up with a single sum due 
from one party to the other. Like most setoff structures, these have transactional 
efficiencies and distributional consequences. The trade association could 
further seek to expand the setoff structure of the ISDA contract if 
clearinghouses never arise to accomplish mass setoff. 
Trade compression can be made to happen outside of a clearinghouse. 
Private firms increasingly can find and match identical positions to compress 
them out. TriOptima is the most successful such firm.
135 Clearinghouses just 
compress more. 
2. Financial Supermarkets  
If clearinghouses were unavailable for netting, then there could be a 
further push for larger, more encompassing firms that could net their 
transactions. The contracts could be written to embed the netting into the 
contract, in ways that would make regulatory intervention peculiar. Consider 
our A and D traders. They trade unrelated risks with one another on the same 
day. One risk is in the foreign exchange market, another is in the oil market. 
Instead of writing two contracts, they write an integrated contract for the two 
items:  A  will be liable to D  for the net of the exchange rate impact on 
December 31 and the oil price impact on the same date. Larger financial 
institutions, with wider trading activities in multiple markets, could more 
readily write these integrated contracts than smaller specialized ones. Netting 
provides an incentive to concentrate the financial market, to facilitate more 
mutual setoffs.
136 The concentrated derivatives market, with five institutions 
encompassing much of the trading, already reflects this pressure toward 
concentration. A rebuttal to the Article’s thesis could be that the derivatives 
market would concentrate further, leading to other types of regulation, if 
clearinghouses are not used. 
*  *  * 
Bankruptcy academics will recognize the general issue emerging: 
financial players probe the contractual and regulatory system to silently expand 
their de facto priority. Financial law has been described as a “400-year struggle 
by debtors and their . . . secured creditors to create security interests of various 
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sorts in the debtors’  property without affording notice to  . . .  other 
creditors . . . .
137 
Other institutions may indeed arise that will transfer risk from one sector 
to another and from one institution to another. But public authorities have little 
reason to encourage clearinghouses for systemic-risk-reducing public reasons, 
when their potential here is so small. 
CONCLUSION: CONGRESS’S FINANCIAL MAGINOT LINE 
Clearinghouses are overrated as means to sop up systemic risk. They 
mostly transfer the risk. Because the transfer is hidden, it is easy to conclude 
that systemic risk has been alleviated, when in fact it has not. 
I here make two contributions to the analytics of clearinghouses. First, the 
risk transfer principle neutralizes most of the extolled systemic benefits of 
clearinghouses, and this principle allows us to organize, deepen, and extend the 
understanding of clearinghouse’ systemic limits. Eliminating risk between the 
two parties to a transaction can mistakenly be thought to eliminate the risk from 
the system, when that risk is only transferred to a third party. Other costs from 
clearinghouses are poorly perceived but very real. They largely offset further 
purported benefits, such as the extolled benefits from reducing counterparty 
risk through collateral posting and setoff, from mutualizing of the cost of 
failure, and from increasing market transparency to reduce panics. Better 
collateral for the clearinghouse reduces the collateral available to others in the 
financial system, mutualization of risk funnels risks  as well as  it dissipates 
them, and clearinghouses can increase opacity as readily as otherwise. Each 
benefit suffers from drawbacks elucidated by basic thinking from finance, such 
as concepts from the well-known Modigliani-Miller irrelevance hypotheses, 
which regulators have failed to use in analyzing the impact of clearinghouses 
on systemic risk. When they do so, they will see the net benefits are much 
smaller than has been thought. 
Like Europe’s Maginot Line of powerful forts to deter, defeat, and roll 
back an invasion, strong clearinghouses seem to be formidable direct barriers to 
systemic risk. But like the Maginot Line, the clearinghouse could simply divert 
the advancing risk. Financial panic will side-step the clearinghouse, sliding 
around the fortress to invade the financial system through other portals. The 
heavy regulatory investment in energy and resources to build the Maginot Line 
diverted defense thinking and spending from more efficacious channels. 
Today’s financial regulators, likewise satisfied that the clearinghouses will be 
bulwarks against financial failure, will attend less to other more efficacious 
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means to arrest systemic risk and, having expended resources on clearinghouse 
construction, will have fewer resources left. 
The second contribution is in my showing that the clearinghouse is not 
designed to handle the major financial debilities of the 2008–2009 financial 
crisis. The clearinghouse, if it could work as planned, would contain the risk of 
a major stand-alone failure from dragging down its financial counterparties. It 
targets the kind of problem that arose in the failure of Long-Term Capital 
Management in 1998—a major financial institution that had deep and tangled 
interconnections with the rest of Wall Street. But the 2008–2009 financial crisis 
stemmed from system-wide overinvestment in mortgage securities, which 
suddenly were worth much less than had been thought, afflicting many major 
financial firms simultaneously. Too many institutions sought to sell these and 
other securities, pressuring prices downward in ways that threatened other 
institutions and induced them to sell assets. The clearinghouse would not 
stymie this kind of crisis from an asset price spiral and could deepen it, as 
clearinghouses are designed to obtain and, if necessary, sell collateral to keep 
the clearinghouses afloat. In doing so, the clearinghouse would deepen the 
downward asset price spiral that worsened the 2008–2009 crisis. 
*  *  * 
The failures of AIG, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and  the Reserve 
Fund brought forth a regulatory program of building clearinghouses to 
encompass more of the risky instruments that played a major role in each firm’s 
failure and the ensuing financial crisis. Regulatory second thoughts on 
constructing these clearinghouses focus primarily on the possibility that the 
clearinghouses will be too big to fail, with proponents concluding that, even 
though this concern has merit, clearinghouses are less likely to fail than their 
constituent institutions. 
But the regulatory balance here (too big to fail vs. lower probability of 
failure) is the wrong trade-off for regulators to weigh. They first need to 
analyze whether the purported mechanism of reducing systemic risk will deter 
a financial crisis such as that of 2008–2009. The primary purported benefit for 
the clearinghouse is strong collateral collection, assisted by a complex, 
multilateral setoff structure. But such structures are well known in bankruptcy 
analysis not to reduce most risk, but primarily to transfer losses from the two 
parties to outsiders. Clearinghouses do much the same. Even if clearinghouses 
were indestructible, they could not reduce systemic risk to the extent that the 
policymaker consensus has concluded they could, because the losses would 
move  to institutions and channels that are often themselves systemically 
important. Indeed, they can readily end up right back in the institutions in 
which they started out. At a minimum, the risk-reducing potential for 
clearinghouses needed more scrutiny before clearinghouse construction became 
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Each clearinghouse benefit is offset by a cost that is either underrated or 
not considered in current regulatory analytics. Collateral given to the 
clearinghouse is collateral unavailable to the member’s other trading partners. 
Counterparty risk reduction is offset by risk being transferred to often-vital 
outside institutions and channels. Mutualization benefits are offset by 
clearinghouses’ equally plausible potential to funnel disparate moderate risks to 
a systemically dangerous focal point. Transparency benefits in ensuring that 
trades are completed can turn into panic-driving opacity when the 
clearinghouse’s solvency depends on a successful capital call from a tottering 
member. Speed in settling some transactions is partly but not fully offset by 
slowed settling of other outside-the-clearinghouse transactions.  
The idea that panic can be averted by shifting losses away from a financial 
firm that has deep, systemically vital interconnections to a clearinghouse 
ignores the fact that the loss shifts to a clearinghouse that will itself have deep, 
systemically vital interconnections with the rest of the financial system. Those 
interconnections could,  in a crisis,  render opaque the viability of the 
clearinghouse members, if they were subject to large capital calls from a 
clearinghouse in financial trouble. Those members would typically include the 
country’s largest financial institutions. The transfer could just change the site 
where the panic starts. If the underlying problem is, as it was in 2008–2009, 
that most major financial institutions had suffered major investment losses in 
American real estate mortgage securities, then the idea that panic can be 
averted by shifting the locus of loss from one major financial institution to 
another risks being wishful thinking, and needs to be rethought. 
The thesis here is not that the clearinghouse cannot contain any 
conceivable configuration of financial failure. Indeed it can contain several. But 
the containable configurations require a precise terrain, specific financial 
movement, and appropriate timing. As a matter of judgment, I have asserted 
here, these configurations are no more likely than configurations in which the 
clearinghouse  fails  to help or, worse, collects, funnels, and focuses into 
systemic problems risks that might otherwise have remained disparate, posing 
no problem for the economy. 
So, yes, scenarios can be constructed in which a realistic transactional 
efficiency saves a core clearinghouse member, which stops contagion, which 
saves the financial system, which steadies the economy. It is not possible to 
show that there is no scenario in which the clearinghouse alleviates enough 
systemic risk to save the country from a financial crisis, because there are such 
scenarios. But we must recognize that the core justifications for clearinhouses 
advanced by Congress and the regulators have major offsets. Centralizing 
information in the clearinghouse could give the regulators a  better 
understanding of how to act in a crisis. Quickly alleviating cash pressure on a 
single clearinghouse member, without raising liquidity pressure elsewhere, is 
another possibility. A third possibility is that clearinghouse standardization 03-Roe (Do Not Delete)  11/18/2013  2:26 PM 
1700  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 101:1641 
induces  a market restructuring of the derivatives industry, and that the 
restructuring leads to smaller, systemically stable firms capturing more of the 
business. 
But such scenarios, and other often just-so scenarios, do not defeat the 
thesis here. The thesis is that the purported core value of the clearinghouse in 
containing counterparty risk and contagion is exaggerated, and sometimes 
incorrect. Superior collateral collection, enhanced mutualization, and basic 
setoff  on average move, but do not reduce, risk. For the most part,  the 
clearinghouse’s impact on systemic risk is to transfer much, and sometimes all, 
of the internal systemic risk to others outside the clearinghouse. It may not 
make the systemic situation any worse, but on average, it’s not going to be a 
major systemic asset, and the extensive worldwide regulatory and legal 
investment in building clearinghouses cannot be justified in systemic risk 
reduction terms, because their systemic benefits are usually offset by 
symmetrical costs, and in some scenarios can worsen the systemic problem. 
The regulatory balance is overweighting the benefit of reducing loss between 
parties, despite the fact that some, and sometimes all, of that loss is shifted to 
other systemically important shoulders. 
Some political economy features can explain the persistence of this policy 
thinking. There is an urge to prop up the visible counterparty—AIG in the 
recurring example we used. But buttressing AIG then under-protects less 
vividly present but no less important firms that are outside the clearinghouse—
Citibank and the rest of the financial system in our examples. And, unlike the 
other major prescriptions to reduce the chance of another financial crisis—
increasing capital, breaking up the biggest institutions, taxing the risky 
instruments, or barring systemically vital institutions from risky proprietary 
trading—clearinghouses can yield large private advantages to their participants. 
Because the clearinghouse’s primary benefit to its members is its capacity to 
transfer risk from its inside clearing members to outside nonmembers, the 
benefited financial players oppose regulators’  efforts to build large 
clearinghouses less vigorously than they oppose other regulatory initiatives that 
they find to be more costly. 
We have lurched toward centralized clearinghouses to reduce systemic 
risk, without knowing whether they will decrease it, increase it, or leave it 
unchanged. The most straightforward logic here, unless more evidence is 
produced, is that it will be hard for the clearinghouse to greatly affect systemic 
risk. Because we unfortunately cannot yet rely on clearinghouses to buttress the 
financial system and the economy well, regulators need to focus more on the 
harder-to-build but potentially more efficacious fixes to the financial system. 
*  *  * 
The second major flaw in the Dodd-Frank Act’s clearinghouse mandate 
here is that clearinghouses are poorly suited to handle the type of systemic risk 
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was not primarily induced by the failure of a single financial institution whose 
problems then cascaded through the financial system. Rather, a market—in this 
case, for mortgage-backed financial securities—grew to be overextended and 
major financial institutions simultaneously sought to sell these securities when 
there were few or no buyers. Illiquid financial institutions were selling and 
asset prices declined, making the book value of the financial institutions even 
shakier, inducing more of them to sell. The downward asset price spiral—a 
panic—exacerbated the underlying financial problems. 
And what would the clearinghouse’s primary activity be in such a 
financial crisis? To protect itself, it would make large collateral calls on its 
members when the collateral backing the cleared trades deteriorated.  As it 
made the collateral calls, prices would decline further, exacerbating the 
downward price spiral. The very feature that proponents extol for 
clearinghouses, namely their capacity to strengthen collateral collection, could 
and would exacerbate a financial crisis. 
Consider this scenario: Sharp value declines later in this decade afflict a 
major financial market, similar to the sharp drop in value of mortgage-backed 
securities in 2008–2009. The crisis might begin on a foreign exchange 
derivatives clearinghouse after a collapse of a euro-nation’s ability to pay its 
debts. Or it might occur on an interest-rate-based clearinghouse if inflation 
induces a jump in interest rates. Or it might occur, once again, in the real estate 
market’s mortgage-backed securities. 
A clearinghouse with members suffering from this decline would require 
its weakened members to make large collateral posts, to protect the 
clearinghouse and the other members. Weak members, required to post 
collateral, will  be forced to sell off risky assets to come up with the good 
collateral to post to the clearinghouse. The sell-off reinforces the downward 
asset price spiral similar to the asset price collapse of 2008–2009. The sales 
reduce the mark-to-market value of other firms with the same assets being sold, 
as well as the selling firms themselves, because the selling pressure lowers the 
value of the firms’ assets. The clearinghouse would not avoid the asset price 
spiral that was central to the 2008–2009 financial crisis, but would exacerbate 
it. 
The scenario gets worse. The regulatory authorities next become aware 
that the clearinghouse is a major accomplice in the downward asset price spiral. 
So regulators then induce the clearinghouse to back off from requiring its 
weakened members from posting collateral. For a few days, the panic subsides. 
But then, the market becomes wary of two consequences of the regulators’ 
suspension of collateral calls: First, because the market is uncertain which firms 
in the clearinghouse are at risk, it fears dealing with any of those firms—and 
recall that the clearinghouse’s members will be America’s major financial 
institutions. Second, the market fears for the solvency of the clearinghouse 
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demanding collateral posts from out-of-the-money, weakened members who 
are losing on their contracts. The clearinghouse’s obligations persist, but it 
would lack collateral to back them up after the Fed and the Treasury suspend 
the clearinghouse’s collateral calls, because the authorities want to thwart the 
incipient downward asset  price spiral. Then, third, fearing that otherwise 
solvent members will be called on to bail out the clearinghouse, more 
businesses outside the clearinghouse stop dealing with clearinghouse 
members—which include the country’s major financial institutions. The 
solvency of more firms becomes opaque, because the extent of their exposure 
to the weakened clearinghouse is murky. The clearinghouse thus would fail to 
provide the very transparency it’s intended to provide, and would obscure the 
financial solvency of major financial institutions. 
The clearinghouse transmits, enlarges, and facilitates this financial crisis 
in this scenario. Or, it simply is unable to arrest a system-wide problem. The 
financial collapse is only arrested when the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury, 
and, if necessary, the United States Congress guarantee the creditworthiness of 
the failing institutions, including that of the clearinghouse itself.
138 
In this short, realistic scenario, the clearinghouse becomes the site of, or a 
facilitator of, each of the major systemic problems of the 2008–2009 financial 
crisis: a downward asset price spiral, a market freeze-up in dealing with major 
financial institutions that could be insolvent, and a panic due to a lack of 
transparency, which combine to induce  firms to stop dealing with financial 
institutions that may or may not be insolvent but have become opaque. Major 
institutions remain in this scenario severely interconnected—this time through 
the clearinghouse itself—in ways that deter the smooth functioning of finance. 
The point here is not that this scenario is assuredly the most likely one to 
emerge in a crisis with the new clearinghouses in place, but that it is no less 
likely to occur than the optimistic scenarios that those in the pro-clearinghouse 
consensus hope for. The system in the end escapes the financial crisis in this 
scenario, but it does so not because of clearinghouse efficacy, but because the 
regulators prop up and bail out the failing but essential institutions, including 
the clearinghouse itself. 
*  *  * 
Were clearinghouses already up and running for derivatives, there would 
be no strong systemic-based reason to tear them down. But we would have little 
reason to feel any safer from the scourge of systemic risk. They might diminish 
that risk, they might increase it, or on average they would most likely move 
most of the affected risks and losses around, substituting new weak links in the 
system for older weak links, leaving systemic risk about the same as it had 
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been. Just as the early twentieth-century Maginot Line did not directly damage 
its builders’ defensive capacity, the clearinghouse does not damage the system 
directly, but it creates unwarranted confidence. What there is little need for, 
however, is for the regulatory authorities to divert their attention from major 
bulwarks against systemic risk (such as capital requirements, activity 
restrictions, risk-taking capital and reserve charges, ongoing regulatory 
oversight, and institutional size) and invest so much of their own scarce 
political and professional resources in a major program to build clearinghouses 
to buttress the system against systemic risk, when the justification for their 
doing so is so flawed. 
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